# THE REVOLUTION OF HAWAII

by

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In Jan. 1893 the country was startled by the announcement that the royal government of the Hawaiian Islands had been overthrown; the Queen Lilioukalani dethroned ; and a Provisional Government, with a desire of annexation to this country, established.

Prior to such an announcement many of our citizens were absolutely ignorant in regard to this most important group of islands in the Pacific. In fact, a large majority would doubtless have found it hard even to locate them. At once there sprung up a wide spread and intelligent interest in these islands found so suddenly knocking at the door of the American union. Had overthrow of the monarchy been the final move, we no doubt should have considered this as one more step in the rapid political evolution of these islands from a feudal despotism to a free and civilized state. But this was not all. The Provisional Government appealed at once to the United States for annexation ,and the lost monarchy claimed that with this in view, the United States authorities at Honolulu had lent a helping hand in the revolution .

It is only this latter phase of the question that I shall attempt to discuss. At some future time I hope to be able to treat in detail the causes of this revolution, for, laying aside the question of foreign interference, there were local

causes both remote and proximate, for the thorough understanding of which we should be obliged to trace the social and political evolution of the islands from the time when they first came in contact with the civilized world, and show the changes which have taken place and the causes by which they have been effected.

The question before us then, is: How far were the United States authorities at Honolulu responsible for the revolution?

The facts are as follows. Up to Jan. 17, 1893, the United States and Hawaii were at peace. Lilioukalani was ruling over a constitutional monarchy in these islands; and the United States had a Consul-General, Vice-Consul-General, Resident Minister, and a war ship always at the islands. Within twenty four hours, or on the next day, Jan. 17, 1893 a revolution had been effected, the constitutional monarchy had been replaced by a Provisional Government. President Dole had taken the place of Lilioukalani, and a vessel was on its way bearing commissioners from this new government to Washington to ask annexation to the United States. Following this commission came another from the deposed Queen bearing her protest. She claimed that the throne had been lost , not through the revolutionary acts of her own subjects, but because of the support which had been given them by the United States

troops under the direction of Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse.

Such an accusation can be justified or refuted only after a most careful and detailed examination of the events of the revolution and the part played in each by the various factors.

For our purpose we shall examine chiefly the events of four days - Jan. I4 to I7 - although it will be necessary to refer to the early history of Hawaii, or we shall fail to understand and interpret correctly the events of these four days.

When the Sandwich Islands were visited by Capt. Cook in the latter part of the eighteenth century, governmental unity was unknown. The several islands composing the group were ruled over by kings who controlled vassal chiefs and granted them certain tenures in return for military service.

Before this ,however, the islands had entered upon a period of political ambition and strife which was not completed until the early years of the present century, when the entire group was consolidated in one government under Kamehameha I .

Originally Kamehameha I. was a petty sovereign ruling over a small district at the north end of the island of Hawaii. One at a time he met and conquered the other chiefs of his own island, and finally extended his conquests over the whole group. The entire social and political organization of the islands was revolutionized. He established a sort of personal government, appointed a governor for each island, and selected four great chiefs who had assisted him in his conquests, to act as a cabinet. All the lands of the kingdom were regarded as the property of the crown, and upon purely feudal principles were apportioned by him among his followers. Church and state were so completely separated that previous to his death in 1819 the priesthood, at the beginning of his reign far more powerful than he , was obliged

to acknowledge

Itself powerless in secular affairs. (I)

For twenty-four years Kamehameha I ruled over these united islands, as strong and able a sovereign as any nation ever honored. Aside from the unity in government which he established, he is interesting to us as laying the foundation of a policy calculated to allow the influence of the white race to assert itself. This was accomplished in two ways: first, by his destruction of the old religion which left the people glad to receive the new faith brought in by American missionaries; and second, by his land policy which later made possible the buying and selling of lands, and the purchase of these lands by white foreigners.

Four more kings of the same name and dynasty followed Kamehameha I. So far as possible Kamehameha II continued and strengthened the policy inaugurated by his father. In this way a careful, if unconscious, preparation was made for the advent of the first missionaries in 1820. At once their institutions and influence became dominant. Christian civilization was eagerly adopted by the chiefs and people, and it soon became evident that the islands were progressing rapidly toward an enlightened nation. (2)

In 1820 the United States recognized the growing interests of the Americans in the islands by sending out a resident

(I) Allen, A.H.: Report on the Official Relations of the United States with the Hawaiian Islands.

(2) Dole, S.B.: Evolution of Land Tenures.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Jarves, James Jackson. History of the Hawaiian Islands. Various extracts from this work are found in the Government Reports on Hawaii. Vol. I. I4I
Same subject is discussed in Dole's Evolution of Land Tenures.

(5) Ibid.

commercial agent, and allowing her naval vessels - from that time on frequent visitors to the harbor - to intervene in a friendly manner when American interests were at stake. (I) In 1827 there were signs that the legislative functions were beginning to differentiate from the executive and for the first time regular laws were enacted. (2)

In 1833 Kamehameha III ascended the throne and a period of rapid progress began. The laws enacted in 1827 were gradually developed until 1835 when the code was revised and improved. (3) It was now evident that still greater governmental changes were necessary. The chiefs realized that they were not competent to fulfill the demands of the times and sent to the United States for a legal adviser who could assist and instruct them in the new policy which circumstances was forcing upon them. (4) In this request the missionaries concurred, and petitioned the American Board of Foreign Missions, but without success. (5)

The chiefs then turned to the missions for help, and in this way without any definite action or object commenced the system, which naturally, in the course of time led to the employment of so many missionaries by the Hawaiian Government. The chiefs needed foreign assistance of some kind; these men were at hand and were faithful, able and willing; it was

(I) Jarves, J.J. History of the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. Jarves quotes the resolutions taken from the missionary minutes for I838 to show the exact views of the missionaries at that time. Senate Report. Vol. I. I4I- 42.

(2) Dole; Evolution of Land Tenures. Senate Report. I. 99

(3) The text of this first constitution with the Bill of Rights , Senate Reports. Vol. I. I2I.

(4) The correspondence regarding this recognition is found in the Senate Reports. 847 - 53.

entirely natural that they should be chosen and should accept. Mr. Richards, who had been sent to the United States for help and had failed, was asked to undertake the instruction of the chiefs in the general science of government. He was released from his position and duties at the mission and made confidential adviser to the rulers of Hawaii. In such a position he became most influential in persuading the king to proclaim a Bill of Rights in harmony with the events transpiring in his kingdom and the needs of his people. (I) This was enacted in the year 1839 and practically transformed a feudal despotism into a constitutional monarchy; or to say the least, it was a virtual rejection of the feudal system and the origin of a constitutional form of government. (2)

With this as a basis the first real constitution was proclaimed in Oct. 1840. (3) Although it was nothing more than a crude constitutional sketch, it gave the people a feeling of security and established the Hawaiian Islands as a civilized and independent state. As such it was first recognized by the United States in the year 1842 in response to the request of the Hawaiian nation made through Messrs. Richards and Haalilio. England and Franne added their recognition in the following year. (4)

While these constitutional developments were taking place

(I) Castle, S.N. Incidents in Hawaiian History. Senate Report page 799. Mr. Castle's statements here are born out by the evnts.

(2) Lord Paulet's demand to the Governor of Oahu. Feb. II.I843

,, ,, to Kamehameha II. Feb. I6. I7. I8.

King's provisional cession to England I843.

Found in the Senate Report. 855 - 860.

(3) Appeal of Kamehameha III to Pres. Tyler. Reports. 866. 86I

(4) Rear- Admiral Thomas to Kam. III . Reports. 866.

(5) Mr. Severance to Mr. Webster , Mar. II. I85I.

Mr. Ten Eyck. Dec. I0. I849. Reports. 900.

under the guidance of American missionaries, events of another nature were transpiring which were calculated to make still more prominent the American influence. From 1835 to 1849 France and England seem both to have been waiting for an opportunity to subvert the native government and take possession of the islands. (1)

The English opportunity came in Feb. 1843 when Capt. Paulet, of the ship Carysfort seized the islands in the name of the Queen, and forced a deed of cession from the King, Kamehameha III. (2) On Mar. 11, 1843 the King appealed to the United States for assistance in inducing the British to withdraw from the islands and leave them again an independent nation. (3) On July 11 Commodore Kearney, U.S.N. arrived at the islands and promptly protested against the Hawaiian deed of cession. On July 25, Rear Admiral Thomas, R.N. appeared , and after a friendly conference with the King, restored the islands and disavowed the act of Lord Paulet. (4)

With France there had been trouble for some time. This commenced in 1839 when the French Catholics were persecuted by the Hawaiian Government. It developed into a misunderstanding regarding treaty rights and the seizure of the island by the French Admiral in 1849. (5)

Official news of this proceeding were sent at once to

(I) Mr. Severance to Mr. Webster. Mar. II, I85I. Also Mr. Ten Eyck. Dec. I0. I849.

(2) Mr. Webster to Mr. Rives. June, I9. I85I. Report. 905.
Mr. Rives to Mr. Webster. July. 8 I85I. ,, 906.

(3) Senate Reports. page 897 -

(4) Ibid.

the United States and assistance was again asked in settling the dispute. (I) This request the United States promptly complied with and instructions to that effect were sent to Mr. Rives, then United States minister in Paris. (2) No conclusion was reached and on Mar.11, I85I Mr. Severance , the American commissioner at Honolulu, notified Mr. Webster that he had received from the Hawaiian Government a sealed paper with indorsement upon the envelop as follows : " The King requests the commissioner of the United States in case the flag of the United States is raised above the Hawaiian, that he will open the enclosed and act accordingly." (3) Mr. Severance continued; " The paper thus sealed is a cession of the sovereignty of the islands to the United States by proclamation of the King, to be held until some arrangement satisfactory to all parties can be made consistent with the treaty obligations already existing: and in case none such can be made, then the transfer of the sovereignty to be perpetual." (4)

A series of dispatches from Mr. Severance to Mr. Webster followed this last communication. From them we learn that the French and English through their representatives, were trying to check American influence in the islands. They had planned an opposition paper to be started in the place of one

(I) Mr. Severance letters to Mr. Webster from Mar. 11 to Mar. 21. 1851. Reports. 897 -905.

recently stopped for want of support, and were making an effort to control legislative elections. Now for the first time annexation was discussed, and the commercial value of the islands to the United States was made prominent. Last of all came the important question, "What shall I do with the King's cession to the U.S. ? Ought I to retain it if he asks for it? I think I shall not give it up until I hear from you. We have a great interest in the islands, and may as well hold the paper as security against the cession to any other power. We should not enforce it against the will of the King and his chiefs, but his health is precarious, and such are the habits of his appointed successors that there is no knowing whom he may choose for his constitutional advisers. He may be weary of the moral restraints imposed upon him now and throw himself into the arms of some interest altogether hostile to us. In that event the paper I hold, may have its use." (I)

Mr. Webster answered these communications on July 14, 1851. He declared that the policy of this government toward Hawaii remained unchanged, and faithful to its original assurances regarding the independence of the islands. At the same time, he added, this government could never consent to see Hawaii possessed by either of the great commercial powers

(I) These two letters are found in the Senate Reports. page 907, 909.

One sentence of Mr. Webster's private letter is particularly interesting when taken in connection with the claims of Americans in the late revolution. " You inform us that many American citizens have gone to settle in the islands; if so they have ceased to be American citizens. The government of the United States must, of course, feel an interest in them not extended to foreigners, but by the law of nations they have no right further to demand the protection of this Government."

of Europe , nor would it be willing to see enforced against the Hawaiian Government unjust demands inconsistent with a bona fide independence. This portion of Mr. Webster's reply is contained in an official communication. Another dispatch of the same day, in the form of a private letter, deals with the surrender of the islands and the proposed annexation to our country. Mr. Severance is ordered to return to the Hawaiian Government its letter of conditional surrender, and under no circumstances to encourage Americans or others to believe that the islands will become annexed to the United States. (I)

During this period constant contact with foreigners, and the rapid internal development of the kingdom called for revision of the constitution. A committee of three was appointed to take charge of the matter and in June 1852 a new constitution was ratified by the legislature, approved by the King and promulgated. This revision was a decided advance over the old constitution in the direction of popular liberty. The House of Reprenentatives was increased to not less than twenty-four or more than forty members, to be elected annually by universal suffrage. The House of Nobles, to be appointed by the King for life, should never exceed twenty members. The Supreme Court was to consist of one Supreme Judge and two

(I) AlexanderW.D. Sketch of the Constitutional History of Hawaii. Reports. Vol. I 3I8.

(2) Senate Reports. 9I4.

associates, appointed for life, but subject to removal by impeachment. The King was to be the supreme executive magistrate. His ministers were responsible to him, and he was allowed the right of absolute veto, although English precedent controlled its exerices during Kamehameha's reign. (1)

In 1853 and 1854, during the administration of Pres. Pierce, an active effort was made to accomplish the annexation of Hawaii. On Dec. 16, 1853 Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Mason, then United States minister in Paris, that affairs in Honolulu were unsettled, and several changes had taken place in high offices. Great Britain and France were apparently much disturbed and were "using all their influence to repress the rising sentiment of annexation to this country." Moreover, Mr. Marcy had talked with the ministers from these countries and had understood from them that every means would be used, even force, to keep the United States from acquiring sovereignty over the islands. France, especially, had tried to impress upon Mr. Marcy the fact that transfer of the islands to this country would be forcibly resisted. If he could do so without calling too much attention to the matter it would be desirable for Mr. Mason to ascertain just what course France would pursue if the United States should attempt to acquire the islands. (2)

(2) Senate Reports. 914. 929 -935.

(3) Text of Treaty . Senate Reports. 935.

(4) Correspondence of Mr. Gregg and Mr. Marcy. Reports. 937-942.

(5) Snow, Freeman; Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy. pages 361- 397 treat of the relations of our country to Hawaii from 1850 to 1895.

In 1854 Mr. Marcy carried on a correspondence with Commissioner Gregg relative to annexation. (2) The outcome of this was the negotiation of a treaty of annexation with Hawaii. (3) Every effort was made on the part of Americans and the American Government to secure the ratification of this treaty, while Great Britain and France strenuously opposed. From day to day the King delayed his signature until at last he died on Dec. 15, 1854 without having given his approval. Had he done so it is not likely that the treaty would have been ratified by the United States Government as its terms were not entirely satisfactory. (4)

The new monarch Kamehameha IV was not favorable to annexation and as the treaty which had been arranged was unsatisfactory to this country the matter was dropped temporarily.

An effort to conclude a reciprocity trety was made the next year and this too was a failure. (5)

Kamehameha IV was inclined to favor English influence as opposed to American. His officials were English, his associates were all English and English teachers and ministers were sent to the islands at his request. Mr. McBride called Secretary Seward's attention to this fact, Oct. 9, 1863 and noted the decline of American influence in the islands. In

(I) Senate Reports. page 942.

(2) Text of the constitution. Reports. I60 I68.

his opinion the time was coming when the islands must pass "into other hands, and their destiny be controlled by other people." The French had retired and there were but two competitors; the question at issue was " to what nation shall they belong, to whom ought they belong, the English or the Americans ?"(I)

This same year, I863, Kamehameha IV died and Kamehameha V, known as Prince Lot Kamehameha, was called to the throne. As he had never approved of the radical constitutional changes made by Kamehameha III he now refused to support the constitution, but seized the opportunity to promulgate a new constitution of his own making which would increase the power of the crown, and do away with much of the American influence. (2)

Kamehameha V had long been jealous of American influence and still he felt that the natives were not prepared for self-government. His new constitution was proclaimed in Aug. I864 without the sanction of any convention or indorsement by the people. For all this it was accepted by the nation, and with few alterations continued in force for twenty-three years, to I887.

A comparison of this constitution with that of I852 does not reveal so many changes as might be expected. The provision which did cause much trouble and which may be considered

(1) Senate Reports. 943. 952.

(2) Official Report on Relations between the United States and Hawaii. Senate Reports. page 822.

as the starting point of revolutions in the islands was article 62, requiring a property qualification for every voter, and in case of birth since 1840, ability to read and write. This clause diplaced the clause of 1852, which permitted universal suffrage, and was exceedingly distasteful to the natives, who when once they had realized the power of votes and their influence , were unwilling to give up the privilege.

From this time on the natives attempted to hold together in the legislature in order to regain their lost influence and rights. Race feeling increased at every step, and , as the Anglo-Saxon easily fulfilled the necessary qualifications for suffrage, he received that which the native felt belonged to himself.

During the peiod of the civil war little attention was given to Hawaii by the United States, but the English and southern influence was exerted to bring about hostility to a closer connection with this country, either in the form of reciprocity or annexation. Occasional mention is made of this fact in the correspondence of the time. (1)

On Feb. 1. 1867 Mr. McCook, our minister in Honolulu was informed that the government desired to renew the subject of reciprocity on terms more liberal to the United States.(2) Again a treaty was negotiated but failed to be ratified by

(1) Senate Reports. page 822.

(2) Correspondence between Mr. McCook and Mr. Seward. Senate Reports. pages 945- 949.

(3) Senate Reports, 951.

(4) Ibid.

the Senate. (1) Mr. Seward and Mr. McCook were anxious to see the treaty a success, and thinking his influence might be of some help Mr. McCook asked permission to visit Washington during the time that the treaty was before Congress. If ratification was accomplished he did not care to remain longer at Honolulu, as he should feel that he had done all possible in his position. If, however, the government should desire to acquire the islands he would like to conduct the negotiations as he felt that they could be purchased from the King and the American people would receive such a purchase with universal acclamation." (2)

Mr. Seward's reply to this letter was "confidential", June 13, 1867. The desired permission to attend the legislature at Washington was given, and Mr. McCook was instructed "to sound the proper authorities on the larger subject mentioned" in his note and ascertain the exact conditions. In addition confidential overtures were to be received and forwarded to the Secretary of State. (3)

For some time following this all the diplomatic correspondence shows a strong desire for reciprocity or annexation on the part of the United States, while Hawaii seems to have lost much of her interest. (4) The reasons for this are found largely in the fact that the sympathies of the Hawaiian

(I) Mr. McCook to Gen. Van Valkenburg, United States Minister at Yedo, Japan. Aug. 3. I867. Reports. 950.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Senate Reports. page 95I.

Government at this time were English and it was well understood that nothing was maintaining the supremacy of American influence in the islands except commercial relations. (1) In 1867 the Hawaiian Government sent an envoy to Japan to negotiate a treaty with that government which would admit Hawaiian sugar and other products on an equality with those of the United States. (2)

Had they been able to secure this market they would have become entirely independent of the United States and her commercial and political supremacy would have been lost. This was seen by the American minister who at once took steps to prevent the negotiations of the desired treaty. (3)

On July 5, 1868 Mr. Seward sent Mr. Spaulding a "confidential". Quite a change in his tone is noted. He now advised that the subject of national extension and aggrandizement be dropped as the public would not support such a policy. At the same time it should be noticed that he practically refused to abandon his project since he asked for frequent communication upon the same subject. (4)

President Johnson in his annual message of Dec. 9, 1868 called attention to the relation existing between Hawaii and the United States and expressed a personal desire to see closer union between the two countries. (5) In spite of his

(I) Senate Reports. 935.

(2) Senate Reports.page 954.

urgency the reciprocity treaty of July 1867, already ratified by the Hawaiian Government, was not acted upon until 1870 and was then rejected.(1)

Representatives of the American Government at Honolulu were even more anxious than the President to see the annexation of Hawaii an accomplished fact. On April 14, 1869 Mr. Spaulding, in charge of the American Legation, wrote a private letter to his father which is of considerable interest. The news of the probable failure of the reciprocity treaty had just reached Honolulu. The effect had been to call forth a strong and determined expression in favor of annexation. As long as there was any hope for reciprocity, annexation was not desired; but when reciprocity failed the planters must have relief of some kind and sought it in annexation. The question which was troubling the annexation party was whether it would be backed by the United States Government and its representatives if it should attempt to make a political change looking toward annexation. Personally Mr. Spaulding favored the acquisition of the islands, and to him the American policy so long pursued in the islands, seemed exceedingly faulty. He thought the return of the Lackawana to Honolulu, which was objected to by the Hawaiian Government, might be used as an excuse for active intervention. (2)

On September 23, 1889, about one month after this rebellion, and as we readily see at one of the most complex and important periods in the history of Hawaii. Minister Stevens first became connected with that country as United States minister.

Mr. Steven's early history is well know, and I shall cite here only the most necessary facts regarding his life. He was born in Maine in 1820 and prepared himself for a minister of the Universalits church. In 1855 he became associated with James G. Blaine, as partner and co-editor of the Kennebec Journal. He was chosen a member of the state legislature and filled this position from 1865 to 1870. From 1870 to 1873 he was U.S. minister to Uruguay and Paraguay. In 1877he was appointed Minister to Norway and Sweden. While filling this position he wrote his history of Gustavus Adolphus. In 1889 he was sent as minister to Hawaii during the administration of President Harrison when Blaine , his old partner, was Secretary of State.(1)

From these brief statements we gather much information that is valuable for our study. We find that Mr. Stevens was already an old man when he went to Honolulu and that he had had considerable experience in dealing with foreign countries

(I) Minister Steven's Testimony. Reports. 536

Also various writers mention same incidents.

Princess Liliuokalani, who had already been named by her brother as his successor, and who was even more bitterly opposed to the constitution than he, was connected with the plot and expected the revolutionists to force the King to abdicate in her favor. (I) Whatever the truth may be, and there is undoubtedly some on both sides, the whole action is very amusing, for eventually the volunteer riflemen and citizens took up arms for the government and it turned out to be Kalakaua's government putting down a rebellion against him, although he was believed to have connived at it.

At this time also, marines were landed from the United States ship Adams, at the request of the government. They were returned to their ship the next day without taking any part in the conflict except as their presence gave moral support to the governmental forces of Hawaii. (2)

The insurgents were defeated, several were killed, and Wilcox with about sixty of his followers was imprisoned. Although this revolution was a failure, it is peculiarly interesting to us as it furnishes the only instance in Hawaiian history when the natives attempted to assert themselves independent of foreigners. (3)

(I) Alexander. W. D. Reports. 285.

(2) Ibib.

(3) Statement of Hawaiian Patriotic League. Reports. I726.

lery as a subaltern. The government at that time recalled all its foreign students and with others Wilcox returned in November 1887. After his return he seems to have been disapproved of by the government and boycotted by the reform party. He then identified himself with the party surrounding the King's sister, Princess Lilioukalani and devoted his abilities and energy to carrying out her schemes for gaining the power then in the hands of the King. Several minor intrigues and conspiracies were developed in opposition to the reform successes of 1887. In all of these Wilcox had a prominent part, and especially in what is known as the "Dominis" conspiracy, which had in view the abdication of the King and the crowning of the Princess, by whom it was instigated. For his part in this conspiracy Wilcox was ordered to leave the country. He did so, going to San Francisco where he remained until recalled by the Princess to assist her in 1889 in " restoring the rights of the native chiefs". He responded to her summons and at once took charge of the revolution. (1)

Exactly what was in the minds of those sharing in this revolution is hard to tell. Testimony of value is presented to show that the King was a party to the plot, expesting to overthrow the constitution of 1887 and establish one of his own making. (2) On the other hand it seems certain that the

(I) V.V. Ashford. Reports. I477.

R.W. Wilcox. Ibid. I8I3'

(2) V.V. Ashford. Reports. I478.

R.W. Wilcox. Ibid. I824.

W.D. Alexander. Ibid. 285.

The foundation was now laid for the ultimate abrogation of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic.

Two successful revolutionary acts had now taken place in the islands, that of Kamehameha V in 1864, and that of the reform party in 1887. This led the natives to feel that they too would be successful if they should inaugurate a revolution and try to establish their claims. Accordingly an insurrection was attempted in July, 1889 with the hope of restoring the lost prerogatives of the King. (1) The leaders of the movement were Robert Wilcox and Robert Boyd. Both were half-caste Hawaiians. But little is found concerning Boyd. Wilcox's character is thoroughly discussed and as he is by far the more important leader, as well as one who plays a prominent part in later Hawaiian history, a short sketch of his life may be desirable.

Wilcox's father was a native of Connecticut, his mother was a native Hawaiian. When twenty years of age Wilcox was chosen to represent his district in the legislature. Subsequently he was selected by the government, as was then the custom, to be sent abroad and educated at the public expense. For several years he studied in the best military and engineering schools of the Italian government. When the revolution occurred in 1887 he was serving in the Italian artil-

(I) Alexander, W. D. Reports. 285.

Minister Stevens. Ibid. 526.

to the people through the legislature and could no longer be dismissed at the pleasure of the sovereign unless he was supported by a legislative vote of want of confidence. Third, members of the legislature were prohibited from holding an executive or judicial office during their legislative term, and vice versa. Other less important changes were made. Among them we find the veto power of the King was limited, and article 62 of the old constitution, which had practically excluded foreigners from the suffrage, was extended to include all male subjects. By these provisions the King lost much of his power. The cabinet was the government, approved or disapproved by the legislature, while the sovereign could not act without its assent and became a mere figure-head in his kingdom. The natives, too, in their own estimation, suffered by the change. They had been partially disfranchised and their votes bestowed upon foreigners. It was in keeping with their character to prefer the old Kamehameha constitution under which everyone but themselves had grown rich. From this time on the crown sought to regain its lost power and the natives to restore the old constitution. Elections were held with these ends in view and during the remaining years of this reign the constitutional struggles were very bitter. This was the first step in the period of unrest and revolution

ready at a moments notice to support the political organization in demanding a new constitution. The political organization was composed entirely of whites - Americans, English, and German - largely the former. It extended throughout the islands although the active participants were all in Honolulu. The military organization was known as the " Honolulu Rifles" and had been organized under the laws of the kingdom, swearing allegiance to the King. (I)

A mass meeting was called June 30, 1887 and strong demands were made upon the King. A committee of thirteen was selected to wait upon him and present the resolutions which had been adopted by the meeting. To these he agreed without debate and the constitution of 1887 went into operation. (2)

This constitution like that of 1864 was a mere revision, but its object was quite different - to end personal government in the islands by limiting the power of the monarch. With this purpose in view there were three notable provisions (3) First, the House of Nobles, (under the old constitution appointed by the crown) was to be elected for six years by a restricted vote based upon a property qualification. This would give the whites the choice of half the legislature and about three-fifths of the power which had formerly been in the hands of the sovereign. Second, the ministers were made responsible

(I) Statement of Charles Gulick. Reports. I567.

" John A. McCandless. Ibid. 603, 6II

(2) Reports. 2II

W.D. Alexander's Report. Reports. 283.

Chief Justice Judd. 439.

(3) Text. Reports. I054.

Throughout Kalakaua's entire reign there was a steadily increasing assumption of arbitrary powers, unnecessary and extravagant debts were contracted, and corruption in governmental affairs progressed until the power in the hands of the king became so great that a reaction set in and a new constitution was forced upon him in 1887 by the foreign population. Scandal, bribery and corruption had characterized his reign from beginning to end, and at last came the announcement that he had received a large bribe for the monopoly of opium selling on the islands. (1) The patience of the people was exhausted and the better class of citizens formed a political organization, a secret league intending to force the king to give up many of his prerogatives. (2) The testimony at hand would seem to indicate that at this time there was considerable discussion regarding the advisability of establishing a republic, and many felt that it would be the best way of removing the difficulty. (3) On the other hand there were those who felt that amendments to the constitution could be made of such a nature that the king would have less power and the rights and property of the whites be more observed and respected. (4) The organization of this conspiracy was quite complete. It had its committee of safety and its military commander and force, uniformed, equipped, drilled, and

(I) Alexander, W.D. Reports. I465.

(2) Ibid. I469.

(3) Trousseau, G. Reports. I787.

Statement of Hawaiian Patriotic League. I723.

Statement of V.V. Ashford. I477

(4) Testimony of Albert B. Loebenstein, Reports. I678.

L.A. Thurston, 596.

R.W. Wilcox. I823.

duction of sugar. Much American capital had already been invested in these sugar plantations and as the import duty on raw sugar had been three cents per pound from 1861 to 1870, when it was reduced to two cents, the advantages that reciprocity would give to plantation owners were obvious. (1)

From this time on sugar became the chief product of the islands, and closer commercial relations with the United States became an important factor in political considerations Those who had favored annexation now had reciprocity as a basis for assuming that Hawaii was already a part of our territorial possessions. (2) Those who were hostile to American influence felt that a stronger pressure should be brought to bear against an extension of our reciprocity treaty. (3)

In 1884 the treaty limit was reached. It was then extended although considerable discussion was caused in Congress by the sugar interests of this country. At this time an additional provision was introduced granting the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River and establish there a coaling and repair station. (4) Again Great Britain opposed the policy of the United States both as to the extension of the treaty and the Pearl River cession. (5)

(I) Mr. McBride to Secretary Seward Oct. 9. 1863.

Senate Reports. 944.

(2) Mr. Blaine to Mr. Comly Senate Reports. 977.

(3) Mr. Comly to Mr. Blaine. Reports. No. II3. I2I. I22.

(4) Senate Reports. 83I.

(5) Ibid.

and powers, much of the future trouble in his kingdom might have been averted.

In the early part of his reign came the turning point in the industrial and political history of the islands. Previous to his election he had opposed foreign influence but after his accession he favored a reciprocity treaty with the United States. (I) With this in view he came to America in the autumn of 1874. (2) It is worthy of note that the English and French commissioners were opposed to this visit of the King, claiming that he was needed at home and should not leave the islands for any purpose. (3) It is equally important to note how thoroughly this opposition and the underlying motive were understood by Minister Pierce. (4)

Kalakaua was successful in his undertaking and a treaty was concluded Jan. 30. 1875. (5) It was ratified and proclaimed by both governments although there was considerable opposition in the islands by those who were interested in English supremacy, and naturally looked upon this as one definite step in the direction of annexation. (6)

The provision of this treaty which was of most importance was the admission of Hawaiian sugar into our ports free of duty. For many years the islands had been recognized as among the most valuable lands in the world for the pro-

(I) Alexander. W. D. Reports. I454.

(2) Report of Senate Committee. 828.

Alexander. W.D. Reports. I454.

(3) Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish. Reports. 97I.

" The English and French commissioners here inform me that they are opposed to the act of King Kalakaua's departure out of his kingdom, on account of its present political condition. I am , however of the belief that they are not actuated therein by a real regard for the welfare of this nation but by a desire to throw obstacles in the way of and prevent if possible closer relations taking place between Hawaii and the United States.".

(4) Text of the treaty. Reports. 972.

(5) Senate Reports. 822.

On Feb. 3. 1874 King Lunalilo died without having named any successor. Once more the selection of a sovereign fell to the legislature. This time there were only two contestants, Emma and Kalakaua. (1) Emma was the favorite of both natives and English, and was looked upon by all as far the more promising and responsible of the two candidates. On the other hand there was a large party which felt that her election would mean English supremacy. For this reason it was unwilling to see her on the throne and gave its influence and support to Kalakaua who in this way was the successful candidate. (2) When the legislative committee attempted to announce Kalakaua's victory Queen Emma's adherents made an attack upon the government building and the opposition party. American troops were landed at the request of the minister of foreign affairs and remained on shore for eight days. During this time they were under the control of their own officers and were not required to take any part in the conflict. (3)

It is the career of this king which furnishes an important element in the political evolution of the islands, for during his reign there originated or were emphasized many of the causes which finally led to the revolution of 1893. When he ascended the throne the prospects for a long and peaceful reign were good, and had he made proper use of his rights

(1) Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish. Reports. 967

Testimony of Theodore F. Jewell, U.S. Navy. Reports. 422

Statement of Chief Justice Judd. Ibid. 439.

" " Admiral Belknap. U.S. Navy. Ibid. 711.

" " W.D. Alexander. Ibid. 1453.

" " V.V. Ashford. 1476.

" " Charles Gulick 1560.

(2) Ibid.

(3) W.D. Alexander. Reports. 1454.

Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish. Ibib. 967.

Mr. Pierce had judged correctly regarding the death of Kamehameha V and the difficulty which would follow when an election was made by the legislature. In 1872 his prophecy was fulfilled and the history of an hereditary monarchy in the islands closed.

Queen Emma, widow of Kamehameha IV, Kalakaua, and Lunalilo, to whom the throne seems rightly to have belonged, were the claimants. Lunalilo was the successful candidate much to the delight of the American or Reform party which felt that its lost power would be regained , as the new King was supposed to be favorable to American interests. (1)

During this period reciprocity and annexation were the main topics of conversation. Annexation was the first choice and could it be secured reciprocity was not to be thought of. Secretary Fish and Minister Pierce did not lose any of their enthusiasm or interst in the question and their correspondence keeps the discussion constantly before us. (2) At the same time Mr. Fish realized that the growing interests of the sugar estates of the south were sufficient to prevent favorable consideration of reciprocity by this country, and he frankly stated the situation in his communication of March 25, 1873. (3)

(I) Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish. Senate Reports. II. 959. 960.

(2) Senate Reports. 960. 96I.

Feb. I7. I873 , Mr. Pierce to Mr. Fish.

" Annexation of these islands to the United States and a reciprocity treaty between the two countries are the two important topics of conversation and warm discussion among Government officials and foreign residents.

----------Annexation of the islands to the United State will never, in my opinion, be adopted or presented as a Government measure, however much the people as a whole may desire it..... Should the great interests of the country, however, demand that " annexation" shall be attempted, the planters, merchants, and foreigners generally will induce the people to overthrow the Government, establish a republic, and then ask the United States for admittance into its Union". p. 96I.

(3)7 Senate Reports. 967.

President Grant concurred in President Johnson's views regarding reciprocity or annexation, and followed his example in keeping a diplomatic agent at the islands who shared his opinions. During this administration Mr. Pierce was minister in Hawaii. On Feb. 25, 1871 he wrote to Secretary Fish recommending to the attention of the President the subject of annexation, and made a complete summary of all the arguments in favor of the same. (1) President Grant transmitted this paper to the senate with a message asking its views upon the matter. (2) Mr. Pierce suggested that the time had come to consider the question of annexation, which must be looked upon as the political destiny of the islands. He thought that the death of Kamehameha V was not far distant, and when this occurred there would be no legitimate heir to the throne and a political crisis would surely come. Such a time he considered a most "propitious occasion to inaugurate measures for annexation." (3)

(1) Senate Reports. 825.

(2) Ibid. 824.

(3) Ibid. It is interesting to note that nearly all the correspondence of the early years agrees in feeling that the United States Government must at least sanction any movement toward annexation. Mr. Pierce sys:" It is evident, however, no steps will be taken to accomplish the object named without the proper sanction or approbation of the U.S. Government."
Mr. Spaulding's statement to his father is much the same. "I have already given you my opinion as to what the missionary or American party would do if left to themselves-absolutely nothing. In a short time they would be bound hand and foot and powerless to resist the machination of the French and English. They are like raw troops. Unless they can feel that they are supported by the"veteran hand" of the United States they will run at the first flash of powder or sight of blood. But shove them into the front rank and let them feel that they are safe and they will make as much noise as anybody."

[illegible]

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we should expect to find taking sides with the reformers. Undoubtedly prospect of sharing in the Reform victory, which alone they could not win, was the controlling motive.

In the same connection claims are made that Minister Stevens favored the conspiracies and secret leagues formed by the Reformers. In fact the statement is made that some of their meetings were held at the American legation. (I) It is exceedingly difficult to decide upon the justice of such claims. There is no reason for denial, and still I can find no support for an affirmative decision except the testimony of the opposition, together with Mr. Stevens' own behavior and correspondence a short time before these events. I shall cite the most important portions of his correspondence with the department of state between the elections in February and the rebellion in May. Each one may then decide for himself how far Minister Stevens was informed of ,and in sympathy with this revolution.

On February 8, 1892 Minister Stevens wrote that he could see no prospect of the political situation changing until the islands became a part of the American union, or a possession of Great Britain. At the same time he was fully convinced that a new departure by the U.S. as to Hawaii was a necessity. Annexation was the only remedy if Great Britain

(I) Reports. I728.

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Smith, Castle, Hartwell, and Waterhouse were the leaders on the side of the Reform party. They were unwilling to take charge of such a revolution and left, at least its public management, to the leaders of the Liberals, Wilcox, Ashford, and Bush. (I)

It should be noted here that although Wilcox was the leader of the revolution of 1889 against reform measures he now seems to be converted to the side of the people. Possibly it will not be necessary to go into details regarding the reason for this change. In fact it would be hard to reach any satisfactory conclusion unless, indeed, the whole responsibility be thrown upon Wilcox's own character. His colleague, Ashford, states that the change was due to the fact that in 1889 after his capture the Queen deserted him and claimed that she had no knowledge of the affair. (2) Whether this be true or not is immaterial as one can readily see that Wilcox was a man of no principle and cared very little with which side he identified himself.

Ashford had been a prominent man in the government. Difficulty with his political friends had led them to distrust him, and probably with good reason. He was a brother of C.W. Ashford, mentioned above.

Bush was a man of no character and the last man whom

(I) Reports. I728,987, I57I,I747.

(2) Ibid. I428. I483.

(3) Ibid. I476.

[illegible]

[illegible] (2)

[illegible]

[illegible] (3)

[illegible]

[illegible] (5) [illegible]

[illegible] 1950 [illegible]

[illegible]

absolute rule of the Queen; a new constitution with universal suffrage, and hostility to the American treaty (I) Although this party should rightly be considered as a unit, it was not such in this session of the legislature. It really had two wings or factions, known as the Progressive Liberals, and Royalists. Each formed a separate factor in the legislative contests. (2)

With this division of parties we shall readily see that no one faction could possess a legislative majority. (3) At once party lines were broken, and various combinations were formed in order to accomplish the desires of the different leaders or parties. The Nationals allied themselves with the conservative or native wing of the Liberals and together they are spoken of as Royalists. In this way the Nationals succeeded in selecting a majority of the officers, as well as having the influence of the cabinet and Queen on their side. (4)

On the other hand the Reform party united with the Progressive Liberals, although they disagreed entirely regarding policy. (5) It was through this last combination that the revolution of 1893 was attempted.

For some time rumors had been in circulation regarding the formation of conspiracies for annexation. Messrs Thurston

(I) Reports. I728

(2) Ibid.

(3) Classification of the members of the Legislature of I892, with respect to parties.

| Nationals. | Reform. | Liberals. |
|---|---|---|
| I.Parker. | I.Kaukane. | I.Bipikane |
| 2.Widemann. | 2.J.M.Horner. | 2.Ashford. |
| 3.Spencer. | 3.Walbridge. | 3.Aki. |
| 4.Whiting. | 4.Anderson. | 4S.K.Pua |
| 5.Walker | 5.Thurston. | 5.R.W. Wilcox. |
| 6.Berger. | 6.G.N. Wilcox. | 6.Rush. |
| 7.Ena. | 7.Kanoa. | 7.Nawahi. |
| 8.Macfarlane. | 8.Wilder. | 8.Koahou. |
| 9.D.M.Pua. | 9.Kaluna. | 9.Kamancha. |
| IOPeterson. | I0.Josefa. | IO.Nahiun. |
| II.Cummins. | II.W.O.Smith. | II.White. |
| I2.Williams. | I2.A.S.Wilcox. | I2.Kaneatis. |
| I3.Neumann. | I3.W.Y.Horner. | I3.Akina. |
| I4.Hoapili. | I4.A.Horner. | I4.Edwards. |
| I5.Cornwell. | I5.Baldwin. | |
| I6.Kapale. | I6.Marsden. | |
| I7.Kaunamano | I7.Young. | |
| I8.Waipuilani. | | |

Independents. Hind, Dreier, Kauhi,

(4) Reports. 46

(5) Reports. I833. I574.

[illegible]

[illegible] (7)

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (7)

[illegible]

These three men were afterward prominently connected with the Provisional Government. The leading Germans, Americans, and Portuguese, in general property owners, belonged to this party. (1)

The National Reform party was really a division of the Reform. Originally they were known together as the Reform party. When the division took place the Reform party stood for the power of the people, and the National Reform for the power of the crown. The leading members of this party were English and Canadian whites, whose property interests were small, if any. (2) This party controlled 20 votes, and both cabinet and Queen were its supporters. (3) The English minister, Wodehouse, affiliated ith this party as it favored English interests and if possible an English protectorate, as opposed to American commercial supremacy (4) The American minister, of course, identified himself with the interests of the Reform party. (5)

The third party was known as the Liberal. It was composed largely of irresponsible white voters, half-castes, and many natives (6) R.W. Wilcox, leader of the revolution of 1889, was its most important representative. (7) Fourteen members of this party were to be counted in the legislature.(8 The main lines of policy laid down by the party were: the

(I) " Many of the Reform party were sugar planters"

R.W. Wilcox, Reports. I8I9

Reports. I930 f. Various tables show the industries of the islands, the capital invested, and the members of the various corporations.

The census reports of I890 makes the total population of the islands,96,075.( some place it 89,990)

Americans.....I,928

Natives and half-caste.40, 6I2

Chinese.....I5,30I.

Japanese..... ....I2,360

Portuguese..... 8,602

British..... I,344

German..... I,034

French..... 70 Reports. I348 , I728

(2) Ibid.

(3) Reports. I945, I809

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid. I945

(7) Ibid.

(8) Ibid.

partial witnesses on the side of the Royalists. (I) All four of the cabinet were members of the National Reforn party. (2)

The representatives and nobles had been chosen, February 3,I892 after a most exciting canvass. When they took their seats in May of the same year there were three parties of nearly equal strength, the Reform, National Reform, and Liberals. (3)

The Reform party, often referred to as the missionary party, controlled, at the opening of the session, I8 out of the 52 members (4) Its object was " closer commercial relations with the United States, the construction of an ocean cable ,and the development of agricultural interests based upon the minimum taxation for the support of the government"(5 Its leaders were L.A. Thurston, H.P. Baldwin,and W.O. Smith.

Mr. Thurston has already been noted in connection with the "Blaine treaty". Mr. Baldwin was a native of the islands residing on Maui, where he owned two plantations. He was a wealthy man and according to his own account represented plantations which had an output of 23,000 tons of sugar in I893. (6)

Very little information is given regarding Mr. Smith. Many indirect reference, as well as his own testimony, lead one to consider him a capable business man of honor and integrity.

(I) Reports. I809

(2) Ibid. I946

(3) Ibid. I945.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Reports. II2I

(6) Ibid.I878.

V.V. Ashford gave expression to their desire in the rebellion on 1892. (1)

To understand this rebellion and the events which follow some knowledge of the composition and acts of the legislature of 1892 will be necessary.

The Hawaiian legislature was composed of 52 members who sat together as a body of the whole. There were four ministers, and 24 each of representatives and nobles. The four ministers were chosen by the Queen and could be removed only by a legislative vote of want of confidence. Representatives and nobles were chosen by the people. The latter required a property or income qualification. (2) The ministry at this time consisted of Samuel Parker, minister of foreign affairs, Judge H.A. Widemann, minister of finance; Mr. Spencer, minister of interior; and W.A. Whiting, attorney general. (3)

The minister of foreign affairs had been prominently connected with Hawaiian politics throughout the Queen's reign, and was again in her cabinet at the time of the revolution of 1893.

Judge Widemannwho had been a resident of Hawaii for 47 years was a native of Hanover, Germany. During the time of his residence in Hawaii he had held nearly every office which the country could offer. He is one of the best and most im-

(I) Reports. I48I. I720. I57I.

(2) Constitution of I837.

(3) Reports. I650.

From the beginning of her reign the official acts of the Queen were unsatisfactory. Party lines were more closely drawn, while race hatred increased. According to Minister Stevens considerable doubt and fear prevailed among the better class of people as to the course of the new queen.(I) On September 5, 1891 Minister Stevens wrote that the Hawaiian cabinet was about to renew its efforts for a revision of the reciprocity treaty. This seemed to Minister Stevens a most opportune time for the United States to enter into a closer union and establish a more positive policy regarding the islands. He enumerated the great benefits which would arise from a new treaty to both the United States and Hawaii. He argued that there could be no possible objection to negotiating a full free trade treaty with that country. (2)

In spite of the arguments of Minister Stevens and the efforts of the annexation party, it soon became evident that no suitable treaty could be negotiated. This caused annexation again to become the dominant wish of the reform party. Such a desire coupled with the opposition to the reactionary policy of the Queen led to the formation of secret leagues. The object of these leagues was to establish a republic looking toward annexation to the United States. (3) The less responsible element of the community led by R.W. Wilcox, and

(I)Feb. 22. I89I.Reports, 834.

(2) Reports. II53

(3) Reports. I48I,I726, I57I.

As has been stated before, the new sovereign was even more opposed to the constitution of 1887 than her brother. When the death of her brother placed her upon the throne she promptly refused to take the required oath to support the constitution. (1) As her feeling upon this subject was so well known, and her desire to re-establish the royal prerogative had already found expression in the revolution of 1889, it was not deemed unlikely that, had the course of events been different, she would have promulgated a new constitution upon her accession, as did Kamehameha V in 1864.

It is claimed by the supporters of the Queen that Minister Stevens had been hostile to the new ruler from the very first. (2) In support of their claims they cite the remarks made by him upon her accession as of a dictatorial nature and not in keeping with his position. (3) The words of Mr. Steven if taken literally can hardly be construed as unfriendly to the Queen. Possibly , however, the Queen's supporters may be correct and the real intention of Mr. Stevens may be found only by admitting a more liberal interpretation of his remarks. The best evidence which can be given to support such a conclusion is Mr. Stevens' own words in his communication to Mr. Blaine, April 4. 1891; "It may be proper for me to say that I have it from the best sources, that my remarks on her accession .....have done good." (4)

(I) Rear Admiral Brown to the Secretary of the Navy. Reports, 2I28.

Statement of Liliuokalani, Reports, I604.

Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine. Reports. II5I.

(2) Senate Reports. 572,II70,I828, I832, 728.

(3) Minister Stevens' Remarks. Reports. II52.

(4) Reports. II55.

Whether the government at Washington agreed with, and encouraged Minister Stevens in these views or not does not appear from the printed documents. It would seem, however, from the events which follow and from Mr. Stevens' correspondence, that he was at least not discouraged, He continued to write in the same tone, and proceeded at once to act upon his own suggestion of " strong pressure and continual vigilance".

In the same year, 1890, another factor was introduced which tended to increase the ill-feeling, already so prominent. This was the passage of the McKinley Bill which removed the duty on raw sugar imported into the United States and practically annulled the reciprocity treaty of 1875. (1) On May, 20, 1890 Minister Stevens had protested against the provisions of this bill as most dangerous and destructive to the future industry and prosperity of the islands, and to closer commercial relations with the United States. (2) His protest was made in vain, as is proved by the action of Congress.

In 1890 King Kalakaua made a visit to the United States and died here in January 1891. (3) Princess Liliuokalani now succeeded to the throne.

(I) Senate Reports. II23.

(3) Ibid. II24. 786

(3) Senate Reports. 834. II49. I665.

The failure of this treaty, together with the results of the election of 1890, emphasized the fact that the gulf between the reform party and the opposition supporting the King was growing wider. The Honolulu papers show that the contest was influenced largely by American interests and sympathies on one side, with opposition to reciprocity or closer commercial relations on the other. (1)

Mr. Stevens was forcibly impressed with the course of events and the danger threatening American interests in the islands. (2) On Mar. 20. 1890, Mr. Blaine received a " confidential" from him in whixh he urged the necessity of taking "decisive steps" to maintain American influence, as well as the abandonment of what he called our " drifing policy". He concluded his letter by saying " The near future is to show conclusively that only the strong pressure and constant vigilance of the United States can enable American men and American ideas to hold ascendency here and make these islands as prosperous and valuable to American marine supremacy in the Northern Pacific as the isles of the Mediterranean have been and are to its adjacent nations ..... It is certain that time and events will not wait for us and that a drifting and waiting policy is now most hazardous." (3)

(I) Quotations from several newspapers are given in Senate Reports. IIII -II23.

(2) Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine. Reports. II23.

(3) Ibid.

become quite prominent in governmental affairs. (I)

When the treaty was presented to the Hawaiian government it created a great disturbance. In some way its terms had been made known to the public and at once , not only the government, but the people as a whole became thoroughly aroused. (2)

Just when the treaty was sent to Hawaii is not stated, but in Mr. Stevens' first letter to the United States government he mentioned the difficulty which it was causing. (3)

After the treaty had been amended and all felt that the King was intending to sign it, the influence of C.W. Ashford was exerted in such a way that the conditions were reversed and the negotiations were a failure. In November, 1889 Mr. Ashford made a visit to his home in Canada. Of course American influence was distasteful to Canada, as it interferred with her power in the Pacific. This was especially true regarding her Australian trade. During Mr. Ashford's visit he was known to have been in close conference with the Dominion cabinet. Also he was entertained by the President of the Canadian Pacific railroad. When Mr. Ashford returned to Honolulu in March 1890 he refused to support his colleagues and the "Blaine Treaty". The treaty was never agreed to by the King. In this way Canada is said to have defeated "Blaine's treaty of 1889". (4)

(I) Honolulu Commercial Advertiser. June 7.I890.Reports,II3I

(2)Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine. Oct. 7.I889 Reports, II00

(3) Oct. 7. I889.

(4) Bishop. S. Review of Reviews. Vol. VII.

the United States; to make permanent the cession of a naval station, and to give the United States the right to land military forces in Hawaii whenever it was deemed necessary for the preservation of order. This last clause is usually spoken of as the " bayonet clause" and was far from acceptable to Hawaii. It is believed to have been the suggestion of Mr. Blaine, and not only the suggestion but the demand, as Mr. Carter, when he transmitted the draft to his government, stated that he objected to the "military clause". (I)

The Hawaiian cabinet was in favor of the treaty and tried to force the king to sign it, not however, until it had been amended and the objectionable features removed. (2) At this time the leading members of the Hawaiian cabinet were L.A. Thurston and C.W. Ashford. Mr. Thurston was a native of the islands, and the grandson of missionaries who went to Hawaii from Connecticut about 1830. He was a man of much ability and exercised a great influence in governmental affairs. From its first organization he had been the most prominent and the strongest man in the reform party. His American sympathies were decided and he later became the leader of the revolution of 1893. (3)

Mr. C.W. Ashford was a Canadian who had been in the islands but a short time. During this short residence he had

(I) Bishop. S. Review of Reviews. Vol. VII.

(2) Cabinet Statements. Honolulu Daily Pacific Advertiser. Reports, II0I.

(3) Minister Stevens. Reports, II30

at my command (I) To my mind this is a point of considerable importance as it throws much light upon Secretary Blaine's attitude toward the islands and partially explains how far Minister Stevens' later policy was countenanced and encouraged or , it may be , even suggested at Washington.

The success of the reform party in 1887 led it to drop for a time its desire for annexation, and to attempt to form a new treaty with the United States which would keep for it the power already gained. As the treaty of 1887 had never been satisfactory to Secretary Blaine this was a favorable opportunity on both sides to negotiate a new treaty. Negotiations with this in view were carried on through Secretary Blaine and H.A. P. Carter, then Hawaiian minister to the United States. The treaty was drafted in 1889 and is generally known as "Blaine's Treaty", although Mr. Blaine's name is not connected with it officially. The main terms of the treaty provided that it should be permanent, and should allow absolute free trade between the two countries in all articles except intoxicants. The United States was to promise Hawaii all the privileges of the United States in its commercial relations. Hawaii, in return for this, must pledge herself to enter into no new treaty relations without the consent of

(I) Mr. Stevens' Letter, Oct. 7. 1887

Statement of the Cabinet of the King. Pacific Commercial Advertiser, Reports. 1101

Bishop. S. Review of Reviews vol. VII. March. 1893

Senate Reports. 833.

In all probability he was thoroughly familiar with the principles of international law and the diplomatic usages and customs that controlled representatives of the United States when residing abroad. In addition to this we see that Mr. Stevens was selected for his Hawaiian position by a Secretary, who long before this had made known his views and desires regarding Hawaii. That Minister Stevens shared the wishes of President Harrison and Secretary Blaine we can readily see from his correspondence and we are by no means surprised when we find him at once taking an active interest in Hawaiian relations to the United States.

In his first communication to our government he showed that he had thoroughly mastered the intricacies of Hawaiian politics and was deeply interested in the future industrial and commercial value of the islands. He claimed to be much impressed by the strong American feeling in Hawaii, especially among men of property. He considered that reciprocity was doing much to bind the islands to the United States. He also realized that the English and French representatives were hostile to any new treaty with the United States.(I)

As it may be questioned what Minister Stevens means by referring to a "new treaty" at this time, I shall explain the statement as well as possible with the meagre information

(I) Mr. Stevens to Mr. Blaine. Oct. 7.1889

Reports. 1100

largely ofnative Hawaiians and a considerable number of whites and half-whites, led chiefly by individuals of the latter two classes.

This party is hostile to the Queen and to her chief confidants, especially opposed to the coming to the throne of the half-English heir- apparent now being educated in England, and means to gain its object either by forcing the Queen to select her cabinet from its own members or else to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Republic, with the ultimate view of annexation to the United States of the whole islands. A portion of this party mean only the former and the other portion intend the latter. Failing to accomplish the former, the most of the party would seek the latter alter native. I have little doubt the revolutionary attempt would have been made ere this but for the presence here of the United States ship of war. I still incline to the opinion that the revolutionary attempt will not be made so long as there is a United States force in th harbor of Honolulu. But it would be rash to assume or assert this positively. Therefore I deem it my official duty to ask for instructions in view of possible contingencies.

I may add that the annexation sentiment is increasing quite as much among the white residents and native Hawaiians and other workingmen who own no sugar stock as with the sugar planters. "

(I) Reports. II6I.

(2) Reports II62. March. 8. I892. As this is one of the most important letter in all Minister Stevens' correspondence I have copied the letter in full.

" In view of possible contingencies in these islands I ask for the instructions of the Department of State on the following, viz:

If the Government here should be surprised and overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement, largely of native Hawaiians, and a Provisional or Republican Government organized and proclaimed, would the United States minister and naval commander here be justified in responding affirmatively to the call of the members of the removed government to restore them to power or replace them in possession of the Government buildings ? Or should the United States minister and naval commander confine themselves exclusively to the preservation of American property, the protection of American citizens,and the prevention of anarchy ? Should a revolutionary attempt of the character indicated be made, there are strong reasons to presume that it would begin by th seizure of the police station, with its arms and ammunition, and this accomplished, the royal palace and the Government buildings containing the cabinet officers and archives would very soon be captured, the latter buildings being situated about one-third of a mile from the police station.

In such contingencies would it be justifiable to use the United States forces here to restore the Government buildings to the possession of the displaced officials ? Ordinarily in like circumstances the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement of the United States forces in foreign waters and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation and of the lives and property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present minister and naval commander here may deviate from established rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated on the first part of this dispatch.

I have information which I deem reliable, that there is an organized revolutionary party in the islands, composed

were not to take the islands. (I)

One month later, just at the very time when the secret leagues already mentioned were fromed and increasing in numbers very rapidly, he addressed a most remarkable letter to the Secretary of State. In this he called attention to the possibility of the Hawaiian government being "overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement," and a provisional government being established. He asked for instructions regarding the use of the troops if such an attempt should be made. A complete reading of this letter proves that Minister Stevens had carefully considered just such a revolution, for he even added that, " should a revolutionary attempt of the character indicated be made there are strong reasons to suppose that it would begin by the seizure of the police station with its arms and ammunition, and this accomplished the royal palace and the government buildings..... would very soon be captured". (2)

Another part of the future reality is also partially disclosed in the same letter. Mr. Stevens followed the recital of the plan for taking the government of the Queen and establishing his imaginary provisional government by a statement that in such cases it had been customary to limit the use of foreign troops to protecting life and property only,

(I) Reports, II62.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. I726, 987, I57I, I747

but, because of the peculiar relations of the United States to Hawaii, he would like to know how far the minister and naval commander might deviate from established international rules and precedents in the contingency imagined. After disclosing this much he concluded his letter by stating that he knew a revolutionary party did exist with the intentions mentioned. (I) Part of the members desired a republic and part annexation, but both hoped for the overthrow of the Queen. (2)

This letter was written fully two months before the Ashford-Wilcox rebellion, and almost a year before the final revolution. Can anyone think that Mr. Stevens was ignorant of the plans for revolution ?

The reform movement of this year which found its final expression in the Wilcox rebellion, was a failure. The better class of the annexation party were unwilling to favor so radical a move and the whole management was left in the hands of Wilcox and Ashford. Both of these men were arrested by the government and it was the intention that they should be punished for treason. (3) Ashford was rescued by the British minister, Wodehouse, who insisted upon the government allowing him to be tried in one of the courts of law instead of

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(I) Reports. I486

(2) Ibid. I728

(3) Ibid. I825.

(4) Ibid. I650. I823

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid. I832.

before the military tribunal as had been intended. (I) Wilcox stood in no great danger while the reform party was willing to make every effort for his release lest his conviction should expose those who had assisted him(2)

Wilcox states that at this time during his imprisonment Minister Stevens made a speech in his favor at "some Grand Army affair" showing that they did not arrest people for such things in America. (3) This was considered to be an expression of Minister Stevens' feelings on the subject, and a declaration of his intention to uphold moves unfavorable to the Queen and looking toward annexation. I find confirmation of this statement in other testimony, but have not access to the speech itself and can not vouch for the accuracy of his interpretation. (4) Nor have I been able to decide whether this is the same speech which was made on Decoration Day when Minister Stevens expressed his anti-monarchical tendencies by condemning all monarchies in general, and reflecting severely upon the Hawaiian monarchy. (5) It seems to me quite probable that the speeches referred to are one and the same, although Minister Stevens appears to have made an expose of his sentiments whenever an opportunity was afforded him. (6)

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(I) Reports. I832. I650

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. I650, I8II

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

These remarks of Minister Stevens' regarding the monarchy were discussed in the Hawaiian legislature and a resolution was introduced requiring Mr. Stevens to make an explanation to the government. (I) The resolution was entered on the records but was expunged by vote, June 6,1892 because of the relations which existed between Hawaii and the United States.(

This attempt to carry out a revolution and to establish a republic was not the only result of the reform-liberal combination. The cabinet mentioned above as a national reform cabinet was voted out by the same factions, August, 30,1892.(3 After about two weeks a new cabinet was named composed of Macfarlane, Parker, Gulick, and Neumann. As this cabinet was no more satisfactory than the one which it displaced it was promptly disposed of by the same combination. (4)

A third time the Queen selected. This time she chose Cornwell, Creighton, Gulick, and Nawahi. (5)

no ¶ These men were even more distasteful than the others and were voted out upon the same day. Three hours ended their term of service. (6)

Several days were now consumed in forming the Brown ministry, composed of conservative men, members of the reform

(I) All testimony given agrees upon this point.

(2) Reports. I8I2.

party, and highly respected and trusted by the entire community. Such a selection was entirely satisfactory to the reform party, but was in no sense of the word a cabinet favored by a majority of the legislature. (I)

At once new complications arose over confining the new cabinet to one party. The National Reformers appeared willing to drop the matter, but the Progressive Liberals felt that as they had been supporters of the Reformers in their early troubles, they should also be sharers in their final triumph. Therefore they now deserted the reform party and returned to the palace party to vote for the very measures which they had opposed earlier in the session. (2)

no ¶ This changeableness in political affairs is a striking illustration of the weakness of the native character, and is largely responsible for the difficulties which arose in Hawaiian politics.

It is impossible to give here the details of the eight months legislature. Nor can one explain fully the various factors which combined to produce this long and bitter fight over the selection of cabinet members. It must suffice at this time to state that there had been several most important bills before the legislature, Prominent among these are the

(I) Lottery Bill. Reports. 76I.

Ibid. 290,68I,I323. I464.

(2) Ibid. I323.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid. 684.

lottery and opium bills, (I) the distillery bill, the registration act,(2) ,and a proposition for convening a constitutional convention. (3) Each one of these played its own individual part and formed one more link in the chain of events which was leading to the revolution.

The lottery and opium bills were not materially different from the same class of bills in our own country. The discussions regarding them brought the common expressions of public morality versus governmental revenue. All kinds of statements are made both by annexationists and royalists, each trying to prove his own party justified in its acts. Before it would be possible to decide just what relation these bills bore to the revolution it would be necessary to answer many difficult questions. One is only justified in saying , that, however the annexationists as a whole may have been divided regarding support or opposition, the reform party did not favor these bills, and the reform ministers who were in office when they were passed were unwilling to see them become laws and were therefore removed to give place to a ministry which would support them.(4)

The bill for convening a constitutional convention was not introduced for the first time into this session of the

(1) Reports. 1835.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid 1170

legislature. It had been before the session of 1890 and had been voted down by amendments to lower the property qualification for electors of Nobles. (1) Now again it was voted down although a change was most ardently desired by both the Liberals and the Queen. Many petitions had been sent to the legislature ,as well as to the sovereign, pleading for this convention. (2) The design of these petitions was to regain for the Queen some of the prerogatives which she had lost by the constitution of 1887, and to grant the natives much of the political power then held by the whites. (3)

While these legislative acts were being discussed and the reform party was clinging to its resolve to select a cabinet, Minister Stevens was still cherishing the hope of success for annexation. He was continually urging his home government to recognize the value of the islands and make them a part of the United States. On October 19, 1892, it was his opinion that the Queen and her faction would have to yield, otherwise the overthrow of the monarchy could not be long delayed(4) On November 20, 1892, almost two months beofre the last steps toward annexation, and soon after the triumph of the reform party in selecting a cabinet, he wrote a long letter to the Secretary of State in which annexation was urged on moral, political and economic grounds. Mr. Stevens

(I) Reports. II85.

desired to express " the opinion with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand " ,while the monarchy was " only an impediment to good government, an obstruction to the prosperity and progress of the island". (I)

In this way ended the year 1892.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(I)Constitution of I887.

(2) Minister Stevens. Reports,520

(3) Capt. Wiltse to Secy. of Navy.Ibid. 2I97.

At the beginning of the new year, 1893, all parties seemed to be fairly well pleased except the natives. The dissatisfaction on their part was not looked upon as of much importance. The native vote alone was not sufficient to cause removal of the cabinet, and the prorogation of the legislature was daily expected. After the prorogation of the legislature it would be unconstitutional to make any change in the ministry until the next session of the legislature.(1)

The feeling of insecurity and uneasiness, so prevalent during the entire session of the legislature now passed away. The opinion was quite general that no further trouble need be looked for until the next biennial session.

Minister Stevens and Captain Wiltse of the Boston, desired to visit Hilo. The former claims to have been fully satisfied that no further idea of revolution was entertained by the Queen, and that even if her desires were unchanged she could not possibly receive the necessary support to carry out her designs. She would therefore be obliged to remain content until the next session. (2)

Captain Wiltse, if we may accept his own testimony and that of Minister Stevens, concurred in this opinion. (3)

(1) Young; Real Hawaii

(2) Ibid.

(3) Lieutenant Laird says that Wilder came with the purser. Reports, 374.

Lieutenant Young says the purser came alone. Reports.328, Real Hawaii, 159.

Minister Stevens says he heard the news when he came into Honolulu harbor. Reports. 523.

Laird's evidence seems to me the best. He did not have the confidence of Minister Stevens and Capt. Wiltse as Young did ,and was not likely to have any motive for adding Mr. Wilder's name unless he were there.

Lieutenant Young differs somewhat, for he says that prior to the sailing of the Boston he was familiar with the views of both these men. Captain Wiltse agreed with him that the Wilcox-Jones cabinet could not last, but Minister Stevens was positive that it could not be removed, and was honest in his opinion. (I)

However this may be, assumong the seeming surrender of the Queen to be genuine, and the apparent quiet to be real, the United States cruiser Boston left Honolulu with Minister Stevens on board and Captain Wiltse in command , on January 4,1893. The objedt of this voyage was two-fold. First, to afford the men of the Bostonan opportunity for target practise. Second, to allow Minister Stevens to visit Hilo before his return to the United States. (2)

On January 13, when the Boston on her return trip had reached Lahaina about eighty five miles from Honolulu, one of the inter-island steamers came in . Mr. Wilder, a member of the Inter-National Steamship Co., and later a most prominent worker in establishing the Provisional Government, came with the purser to the Boston and brought the information that the Wilcox cabinet had been voted out, a new cabinet appointed, the lottery and opium bills passed. (3)

News was also brought that the legislature was to be

[illegible]

(I) Laird's testimony. Reports.374.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Young. Real Hawaii. p. I60 ; Laird.Reports,374

(4) Stevens, Reports. 528,Same statement II94

Laird. Reports. 374.

prorogued the next day. Captain Wiltse and Minister Stevens were notified at once, but no change was made in their plans, as it had already been determined to return to Honolulu the next day. (I)

According to the testimony of the officers, no haste was shown on this return voyage, for we are told that they "went over very leisurely, half steam power ". Besides some time was spent in looking for a pet dog which had fallen overboard. (2)

The Boston reached harbor before noon on the fourteenth. Messengers were not wanting to confirm the reports already circulated. Both Minister Stevens and Lieut. Young landed at once. Lieut. Young attended the prorogation ceremonies as he had been detailed for that purpose by Capt. Wiltse in response to an invitation sent from the minister of foreign affairs. (3) Minister Stevens did not attend the ceremonies, because, as he says, " he had no invitation, the minister of foreign affairs knowing he was absent when he sent out the other invitations" (4)

A question might arise here as to how and why Capt. Wiltse received and complied with a request which Minister Stevens could not receive because of his absence. Mr. Stevens' statement becomes even more open to criticism when we

(1) Reports. II23.

(2) Ibid. 207, 442

(3) Ibid.

know that he later offered an apology for his absence. (I) Surely, if according to his first statement, he was not at liberty to attend without an invitation, there would be no occasion for an apology unless he had received an invitation and had not accepted the same.

Minister Stevens' feeling of security regarding political affairs January 4, was not confined to himself alone. Several members of the legislature who had already too long sacrificed business interests to legislative delays now agreed that the crisis was over and they might with safet return to their homes. This they did, and thus the reform party of which they were members was weakened until it was no longer the controlling faction. The departure of the Boston, added to this loss of supporters by the reform party, revived the hopesof the opposition sufficiently to lead them to renew their earlier efforts to remove the cabinet and pass the lottery and opium bills.

On January 4, the very day the Boston left harbor, Mr. Bush introduced a resolution of want of confidence, hoping to dispose of the Reform cabinet. (I) His effort was a failure, but his followers were not discouraged. On January IO they made another attempt. (2) This time the lottery bill

(1) Reports. 207. 442

(2) Ibid. 1755

(3) Ibid. 207

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid 208

(7) Ibid. 1500, 1525.

was introduced and passed by a vote of twenty three to twenty. (I) The same vote was then cast for removal of the cabinet. Of course it was well known that the Wilcox cabinet would never allow the lottery bill to become a law. (2) According to the last decision of the Supreme Court twenty-five votes were necessary to remove a cabinet, and therefore a second time their plan failed. (3) The Queen and her faction decided that in some way two more votes must be secured and the cabinet removed. Just what measures they may have employed is hard to decide. Undoubtedly bribery of some sort played an important part(4) This time they were successful. C.O. Borger, a German, and W.H. Carnwell, an American, were persuaded to desert their earlier principles and side with the opposition. (5) In this way the cabinet was removed and on January I3 a new one took its place. (6)

This cabinet was composed of C.F. Colburn, minister of interior;W.H. Cornwell, minister of finance;S. Parker, minister of foreign affairs; and C.F. Peterson, attorney general (7) Mr. Parker had long been a favorite of the Queen, and had twice previously been selected by her as a cabinet member. His worst faults seem to have been a general lack of stability and poor financial management. In short he was neither a strong nor a responsible character. Cornwell was a wreck

(I) Reports. I50I

(2) Ibid. I705, 29I.

(3) Ibid. I742. I7I5.

(4) I76I, I7II

both morally and financially and was strongly opposed by all of the best men. Colburn was a man of some property but was not regarded as an honest man in his business relations. Pe Peterson was an able lawyer and a man of marked ability. Had he used his talents to good advantage there could have been no fault with him. As it was , the course he had chosen to pursue had led to loss of character and naturally loss of influence had followed. (I)

Three of this number were rejected members of former cabinets, all were members of the National Reform party, and none could command the respect of the business community. (2)

The Queen's selection at this time was not hastily made; indeed the members had been most carefully chosen some time prior to their public announcement and were thoroughly familiar with the intnetions of the Queen. (3) As soon as the new cabinet was established the lottery and opium bills were signed and announced(4) This was the last act of the legislature. Now the sooner prorogation took place the better. The Queen did not intend to leave time for any action antagonistic to her successes.

Already reports were current about Honolulu that the final act was still reserved to take place on the fourteenth, when the Queen would complete her triumph by the proclamation

(I) Reports. 443

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. I29I

(4) Ibid 222

of a new constitution. As this had long been desired both by the Queen and the natives, and as there was now a new cabinet to sustain them, it seemed as if nothing were wanting for the fulfillment of this last wish. Accordingly on Saturday, January 14, immediately after the ceremony of prorogation the Queen returned to the palace . Here she summoned her ministers to sign the new constitution. After their signatures were added she intended to return to the throne room and proclaim the old constitution abrogated, and the new one the law of the land. (I)

According to a previous arrangement the "Hui Kalaiaina", a native political organization marched from the government building led by its president who bore the new constitution.( This organization was to meet the Queen and her ministers in the throne room(3) There seems to have been no idea of failure so far as the arrangements were concerned.

But this plan did not work out as the Queen had anticipated. The ministers had all been informed of the contents of the constitution and a portion of them had had abundant time to consider any provisions which might have been disapproved (4) This they do not appear to have done. But on Saturday morning when the idea of the Queen was well known and they felt sure that she really intended to promulgate her

(7) [illegible]

(8) [illegible]

(9) [illegible]

(10) [illegible]

(11) [illegible]

(I) Reports. 222, 443,I672, I763.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. 223,I763.

(4) Ibid. 527.

(5) Ibid.

constitution they hastened to Mr. Hartweel, a lawyer of Honolulu, and asked his advice regarding opposition. (I) Mr. Hartwell, Mr. Thurston and Mr. Colburn consulted for some time as to the best way of dealing with the Queen, and both Mr. Thurston and Mr Hartwell advised the cabinet to keep their positions and refuse to sign the constitution. (2) If they did this they were promised that the business community would stand by them and they might feel sure that Minister Stevens would do the same. (3) Mr. Hartwell sent to both Minister Stevens and Captain Wiltse to secure their assistance in opposing the Queen and aiding the cabinet. (4)

We have no record of the messages sent to Minister Stevens or of their contents. He tells us that Mr. Hartwell asked him to go with the British Minister, Wodehouse, and see if they could not persuade the Queen to give up her intention of promulgating the new constitution. (5) He also says that he had conferences with several others at this time but his testimony does not give very much light upon the request which was made .

Communication between Mr. Hartwell and Captain Wiltse was carried on through H.E. Cooper who went personally to Captain Wiltse on board the Boston, and stated the conditions in Honolulu and asked him if he would protect American life

(I) Mr. Cooper's testimony, Reports. I770.

" I had gone , at Mr. Hartwell's request , to see the Captain of the Boston, Capt. Wiltse, anout half past II,and I informed him of the situation, and he immediately sent for Commander Swinburn, who, in turn, sent for the officer of the deck, and all necessary preliminary prepartions were made..... And Capt. Wiltse said that he wasthere for the purpose of protecting life and property of American citizens, and if called upon he would do it ..."

(2) Mr. Smith's testimony. Ibid, I767

(3) Ibid.

and property if trouble should arise. (I) Of course Captain Wiltse said that he would, and thus arose the story that Captain Wiltse had promised his help before Minister Stevens had even been consulted.

After these first steps the events of Saturday become very hard to trace and are so confused that it is almost impossible to distinguish just the order in which they occur. After Mr. Cooper had received Captain Wiltse reply he went with Mr. Smith and Mr. Neumann to the office of the former. There they all "discussed the question of under what circumstances the troops of the .....Boston would be justified in landing". (2) Mr. Neumann's views alone are given. Possibly because he afterward went over to the side of the Queen and it would be natural for him to have taken the position which he did. He thought that the troops could not be landed unless the minister of foreign affairs so requested, i.e. the Queen's government. (3) Whether the other concurred in such an opinion or not, we are not told. Later events seem to prove that the question was a serious one and that at this time the opinions expressed could not have justified their later moves. We will also remember that Minister Stevens had been considering this question for a long time and had already asked his government if it would be necessary to follow es-

(I) Mar. 8. I892.

(2) Testimony of Smith, Cooper, and Castle. Reports. I766

(3) Ibid.

tablished precedent in this case. (I)

So far then as written records go, it could be claimed that Captain Wiltse had promised aid before the Committee was even organized or any demand had been made upon Minister Stevens. But considering that Minister Stevens was called upon at the same time that Captain Wiltse was interviewed, and recalling his earlier letters, it would seem there must have been at least a confidential understanding that he would give his aid when the opportune time came.

The cabinet accepted the advice of Mr. Hartwell and Mr. Thurston. When the Queen called upon them to sign the new constitution they refused.(2) The Queen then became very angry. She accused them of deceiving her and finally declared that she would promulgate the constitution without their signatures if they were not ready to give them. The ministers then asked a few minutes for deliberation and at once hastened to the Government Building where another conference was held with a number of leading citizens. Thurston, Macfarlane Wundenberg, Smith and several others were present. (3) Mr. Colburn did most of the talking for the cabinet, while Mr. Mr. Thurston expressed the views of his friends. He urged the cabinet to continue their efforts against the constitution, but not to resign as in this way new and more difficult

(I) Testimony of Smith. Cooper, and Castle, Reports. I766.

(2) Stevens. Ibid.528

Ibid.

(4)Ibid. 527

(5) Reports. 6I3.

(6) Stevens. 528

complications might arise. Again they were assured of the support of the entire community. (I)

It is rather hard to trace Minister Stevens' actions during this period. After leaving the Boston he went at once to the legation. There he was visited by several friends Among these was Mr. Bishop, and either Mr. Hartwell himself or his messenger.(2) Other names are not mentioned but Mr. Stevens says he had many visitors and remained at the legation most of the remainder of the day. (3)

Judge Hartwell's request to him to visit the Queen in company with Mr. Wodehouse was complied with , but they were too late to see the Queen as she had already gone to the palace. (4) This is the only information given by Mr. Stevens. Others say that he questioned the cabinet regarding the passage of the lottery bill, and when he was told that it had become a law he was very angry and declared that its passage was an insult to the United States. (5)

The other foreign officials followed the Queen to the palace as the entire diplomatic corps had been invited to be present. Mr. Stevens had received no invitation and therefore returned to the legation. (6) Later in the day he was invited with the other foreign representatives to meet the ministers of the Queen for a general conference. He complied

(I) Minister Stevens. Reports. 528

(2) Reports. 596. 613.598.

Charles L. Carter states that on Jan. I4 at the citizens meeting he asked the cabinet what assurance that the military forces of the kingdom would not make an attack Mr. Colburn replied" that as a cabinet minister he ought not to be asked to make answer to such questions in public, but that he could give assurances that a satisfactory settlement was even then being made. .....A request to Mr. Stevens to land his forces had been prepared and was in Hartwell's hands to be delivered."

Mr. McCandless states- Reports. 613 :

" But there was at that time, as we afterward ascertained- did not know it then- a proclamation drawn up by the ministers, and it was even signed - I think drawn up and in their possession ready to be proclaimed at any time - declaring the Queen deposed and reorganizing the governmehh".

with this request although nothing of any importance took place and he soon returned to the legation. (I)

When it became known about Honolulu that the Queen intended to promulgate a new constitution great excitement prevailed. Such an act was considered revolutionary, but of course no more so than the act of Kamehameha V in 1864, or that of the reform party in 1887.

The meetings which took part in the early part of the day were all private. Now public expression against the action of the Queen was given in an informal meeting held at the office of W.O. Smith. This meeting was called about two o'clock Saturday afternoon and was regarded as a response to the call of the ministers for help against the revolutionary desires of the Queen. (2) note Already communications had been carried on between Captain Wiltse, Minister Stevens, and the leaders of the reform party. All had promised to support the cabinet against the Queen. Whether the documents had already been drawn up for reorganizing the government and landing the troops is uncertain. There is about as much evidence on one side as the other. The most that it is safe to state as certainty is that communication had been established between the various parties, who afterward became so prominent, and satisfactory answers had been received.

[illegible]

(I) Reports . 585, I307.

(2) Ibid. I307.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid. I767

(5) Ibid. 453.

The cabinet members who were present at this first meeting were asked to present the situation as it appeared to them and to suggest the assistance that they desired. (I) Several speeches were made by the ministers and by citizens and then a document was presented for the signature of those who would pledge their support to the cabinet. (2) Nearly all who were present gladly gave this pledge. (3) A general discussion was opened and the Queen's action was presented in all its phases. Mr. Neumann thought she had not yet committed a revolutionary act and the expressions of the meeting were rather too strong. (4) Others considered that an actual revolution had been brought about by the Queen and did not hesitate to say so. Mr. Neumann was not pleased with this turn of affairs and left the office. (5)

It was decided by this meeting to appoint a committee of public safety to assist the ministers in their resistance and to consider the best means of dealing with the conditions. The members of this committee were ; L.A. Thurston, a native born subject and the real leader of the revolution; W.R. Castle, a native subject, the son of American missionaries; C. Bolte, born in Germany but a naturalized citizen of the islands; W.C. Wilder, an American, naturalized citizen of Hawaii; W.O. Smith, a native subject, though of foreign

(I) Reports. I770

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

parentage; J.A. McCandless, an American citizen who had been naturalized; H.F. Glade, a German subject; A.S. Wilcox of American parentage; Henry Waterhouse, a naturalized citizen; T.F. Lansing, an American citizen; H.E. Cooper, an American citizen; Andrew Brown, a Scotchman who had never been naturalized; F.W. McChesney, an American citizen. (I) Two of this number, Mr. Wilder and Mr. Glade were not present and messengers were sent to gain their consent to accept such a position. (2)

As soon as possible the office was cleared and the new committee held its first formal meeting. The main subject discussed was the matter of protection in case armed resistanc should be made by the Queen. (3) The committee stated that there was a large armed force at the station house and barracks. Also nearly all the available arms were at the command of the Queen. The Committee had absolutely no military force at its disposal, and as it was evident that such would be essential to success it was natural that this should be the first topic discussed. (4)

This conference gives us proof that the citizens felt that it would be impossible for them to defend themselves and knew that they must have the assistance of the Boston. A committee was appointed consisting of Thurston, Wilder,

(I) Testimony of Cooper and Smith. Reports. I770

(2) Ibid.

and Glade to visit Minister Stevens abd ascertain what his attitude would be, an' if the troops could be depended upon to " protect life and property".(I) Other committees were appointed to see what arms, ammunition, and men could be secured and the meeting adjourned until the next morning when the various committees were to make reports. (2)

At the close of this day, the first in the revolution, there is nothing to show that the people as a whole, or the cabinet of the Queen, had any intention of carrying out resistance until it should include a reorganized government. On the contrary all the acts and speeches of the first mass meeting seem to prove that the general idea was resistance to the one revolutionary act of the Queen. If she would give up her new constitution the gove nment should remain as in the past. With the leaders of the reform party it was far different. They felt that the time had come to form a new government, and while they did not so state in the meeting it seems very clear that even before the organization of the committee the leading minds had been at work laying the foundation for their later moves.

The sub-committees appointed by the general committee were not so long as had been expected in preparing to report. For this reason a meeting was called informally at the home

(I) Testimony of Mr, Smith. Reports.I77I

(2) Ibid. " Mr. Thurston stated that the committee had waited upon the American minister, and that he had said that the United States troops on board the Boston would be ready to land any moment to prevent the destruction of American life and property, and in regard to the matter of establishing a Provisional Government they of course would recognize the existing government whatever it might be. .....Mr. Stevens had told him whatever government was established, and was actually in possessio of the Government Building, the executive departments and archives, and in possession of the city, that was a de facto government proclaiming itself as a government would necessarily have to be recognized. "

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

of Mr. Thurston on Saturday evening. (I) The committee appointed to wait upon Mr. Stevens was present and reported its conversation with him. note (2) The whole situation had been laid before him and discussed. He had answered that he would recognize the new government when it had possession of the government buildings, archives and station house. (3) A report was submitted by the committee on arms and men. This was far from encouraging (4)

The most important event of this meeting was the decision to change the character of the revolution. Thus far the plan had been, apparently at least, that the cabinet and the citizens should unite in a demand for good government. Now it was decided to wait upon the ministers of the Queen, disclose the project for annexation, and if possible secure their assistance in dethroning the Queen and proclaiming a provisional government. (5) If the assistance of the Hawaiian government could be secured in this way through the ministers, who were no longer in harmony with the Queen, then the whole action would be placed in an altogether different light when the time came to justify the support of Minister Stevens and the landing of the troops.(6)

While the plans of the committee were developing so rapidly the government of the Queen was trying to become

I have I made this clear?

(1) Mr. Smith. Reports. 1771

(2) Ibid. 1769,1763.

(3) Ibid. 1647

(I) Mr. Smith. Reports. I77I

(2) Ibid. I769,I763.

(3) Ibid. I647

reconciled within itself. After hours of persuasion on the part of the ministers the Queen had finally promised to delay the promulgation of her constitution until a more favorable opportunity. (I) She announced this resolution from the balcony in front of the palace and advised the natives to go home quietly and wait. (2) There are various interpretations of the words used by the Queen in making this announcement. Those who would support the action taken by the Provisional Government claim that the Queen was really the revolutionary party and that a correct interpretation of her words imply that she only meant to delay the new constitution a few days. The friends of the Queen say that the words interpreted correctly would mean a practical withdrawal of her intention. C.J. Judd has given us the words used by the Queen as " ma keia man la " . He translates these words as " a few days, months ,or years as the case may be ". In short,the term expressed by the words is indefinite and equivalent to our English expression " one of these days. " (3)

It is upon this point that the discussion hinges as to the real nature of the Queen's act. Was it , after her temporary withdrawal on Saturday, and her circular on Monday making this withdrawal permanent, still a revolutionary act, or was the motive alone revolutionary ? That the motive of

(I)Affidavits of J.F. Colburn and A.P. Peterson.

" ..... on that Sunday morning at 6.30o'clock Mr. L.A. Thurston came to the house of Mr. Peterson and stated in the presence of Mr. Peterson and Mr. Colburn tha he wished to have a talk with them. He said that the committee of safety had had a meeting the night before and had come to the conclusion that things could not go on as before ,and that the committee had decided that the Queen should be dethroned and a Provisional government establish ed. He said that Mr. Stevens, the American minister would land his troops and support the movement, if a proclamation to that effect was issued from any building in town.

He then asked Mr. Peterson and Mr. Colburn if they would without consulting their colleagues, as he said they were not to be trusted, take control of the situation and in their own names ask the American minister to assist in carrying out their programme and stated that the document already drawn up by him, a copy of which is annexed, could be changed to suit this proposition". Reports.I439 Reports. I713.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Reports. I838. C.F. Wilson.

(5) Ibid.

the Queen was revolutionary there can be no reasonable doubt, for it is known positively that such a motive did exist even before her accession. On the other hand there are many who agree that after her withdrawal of the proposed constitution and her promise to abide by the old laws, no revolution can be claimed except the one inaugurated by the reform or annexation party. This seems to me to be the correct view.

In order to carry out the plans adopted by the Committee on Saturday evening, Mr. Thurston went to the home of Mr. Colburn early Sunday morning to talk over the new scheme. (1) Together they went to Mr. Peterson and then the three discussed the proposition. (2) Mr. Thurston stated that the Committee had come to the conclusion that the Queen must be dethroned and a Provisional government established. Already Mr. Stevens had given assurance that he would support such an undertaking. (3) Mr. Thurston then proposed to Mr. Colburn and Mr. Peterson that they take control of the affair without consulting their colleagues, and in their own names ask Minister Stevens to land the troops to assist them. (4) note

Taking it for granted that his proposition would be acquiesced in Mr. Thurston had already prepared a request to Minister Stevens which purported to come from the cabinet of the Queen as representatives of her government. (5) The

(I) C. B. Wilson. Reports. 1838 .

ministers declined to give their signature or assist the plan in any way and the matter was dropped. (I)

This early morning effort on the part of Mr. Thurston seems to bring out more clearly than anything else the point which was most troublesome to Minister Stevens and the Committee. Minister Stevens had promised to aid the Committee. It not only wanted the assistance , but must have it or the scheme was sure to fail. The question was - how could Minister Stevens observe the principles of international law and still land American troops to assist in overthrowing the Hawaiian native government ? This question comes up over and over again. It was first suggested by Minister Stevens in his letter to Secretary Blaine on Mar. 8.1892 when he asked how f far he might " deviate from established international rules and precedents." Evidently the solution of this very problem had been troubling Minister Stevens nearly a year.

The same question was raised on Saturday morning after Mr. Cooper's return from the Boston. And in the Committee meeting on Saturday afternoon it was the most important topic discussed. We have no record of the argument on Saturday evening, but we know from the results of the meeting that there seemed to the Committee but one way to overcome the censure which must fall upon Minister Stevens if he assisted

the Committee against the government of the Queen. They must secure the assistance of at least a part of the cabinet and then by dividing the native government the request would be legalized and Minister Stevens could land the troops to assist the government of Hawaii.

When the ministers refused their assistance the last hope of legal justification through the help of the ministry was gone. Some other means must be sought or the project be abandoned.

The ministry of the Queen was united from this time on in her defence. In justice to the men who composed it it should be stated that no evidence appears anywhere to prove that at any time the members of the cabinet had united in the move to overthrow the monarchy. Their sole idea in calling upon the Committee was resistance to the new constitution. When the Queen withdrew her attempt to proclaim it and the Committee still persisted in its plans, developing them to include the overthrow of the Queen and the establishment of a new government, the ministers returned to support the Queen aginst the real revolutionists. It should also be added that the ministry was not alone in supporting the first opposition to the Queen and then later returning to her side when they felt that the Committee had gone too far and lacked proper

(I) Mr. Smith. Reports. I775.

" And Judge Dole was not willing to consent at that time stating that he did not fully favor the idea of annexation at this time and asked if it would not be better to have a regent here and Kaiulani declared the Queen. But after discussion he consented to take the matter under further consideration and let us know his decision the next day at I2 o'clock, the committee endeavoring to persuade him. He recognized that the logical events and manifest destiny of the island was annexation, but he did not know whether it was the wisest step now.

(2) Reports. I775.

cause. Sometime before this Mr. Neumann had expressed his sentiments and from time to time various others had either joined the Queen's party or remained neutral because they felt that they could not favor the methods employed. Even on Monday evening we find that Judge Dole was not willing to support so radical a move although he admitted that annexation was inevitable. (I)

Sunday has always been a quiet day in Honolulu. On this particular Sunday there were no visible signs of the revolution that was developing within its limits. But in spite of this external quiet and apparent calm the Committee of Safety was busily pushing its plans, while the cabinet was considering how best it could assist the Queen in defending her throne.

Both parties held meetings on Sunday morning. (2) The Committee of Safety listened to reports on arms and ammunition Investigation and inquiry had proved that the force to be depended upon was small. Arms and ammunition were scarce. The cabinet had refused its support, and other means must now be sought for carrying out the plans. After a long discussion it was decided to call a mass meeting and present a report to the citizens. This report would show the designs of the Queen in their true light and emphasize their ultimate re-

(I) Reports. I774

(2) Ibid. I772

(3) Ibid. I308, I543, I773

sults. In this way they felt that they could ascertain the real wishes of the people and determine how far they could depend upon them to support the scheme for revolution. If they found the people really enthusiastic against the Queen and in sympathy with their project they intended to ask for a pledge regarding their support until annexation should be accomplished. (I)

At this time two changes were made in the personnel of the committee. Mr. Wilcox felt that he should resign his position and return to his home on Kauai. In case of trouble he could be of more use there than in Honolulu. Mr. M.J. Ermueluth, an American citizen, was chosen to take his place. Mr. Glade who was consul-general for Germany, thought it was not proper for him to accept such a membership and offered his resignation. It also was accepted and Mr. E. Suhr, a German subject, was selected for the vacancy. (2)

The meeting of the cabinet discussed the situation and consulted with several prominent business men. Among them we find the names of F.A. Schaeffer, W.H. Gafford, S.C. Allen, E.C. Macfarlane, J.O. Carter and S.M. Damon. (3) The last two named were later the men who were selected by the Provisional Government to go to the Queen and negotiate for the surrender of her forces.

(I) C.B. Wilson. Reports. I838.

(2)Smith. Ibid. I773

(3)Ibid. I840

(4) Text, Reports. I840

(5) Ibid.

Marshall Wilson declared himself fully prepared to handle the committee and desired to arrest the whole number. In this way he could put a stop to the meetings. The cabinet opposed any such action on the ground that Mr. Thurston had already notified tham that the committee was sure of the protection of Minister Stevens. (I)

That Wilson's suggestion of arrest is just what the committee most feared, is testified to by one of their own number. Mr. Smith says that after the committee meeting on Sunday when they had listened to the discouraging reports of arms and ammunition there was considerable uneasiness as to the safety of the committee. Because of this feeling Mr. Smith and Mr. Thurston went to Minister Stevens to see what he would do if any violent measures should be used by the Queen. (2)

The cabinet concluded to send out a " by authority", signed by the Queen and countersigned by themsleves.(3) This would declare to the public that the Queen had abandoned her intention of forcing a new constitution and that in the future she would abide by constitutional government. (4) It was also thought best to call a counter mass meeting at palace square. (5)

On Sunday evening the cabinet called upon Minister

(I) Wilson, Reports. I839

Stevens. Ibid. 540

(2) Smith. Ibid, I772

Mr Smith states that at these meeting most meagre minutes were kept, " because of the possible danger of our being arrested and of these records being used against us ".

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid. I773

Stevens and told him that the Queen was prepared to meet any attack and had sufficient force to defend herself. They then inquired what position he intanded to take in case of and armed insurrection against the government of the Queen. His reply is reported quite differently by different persons. But whatever the wording it was plainly evasive and was interpreted by the cabinet as unfavorable to the Queen's side. (I)

Another session of the committee was held on Sunday evening. Between the moring session and this one considerable work had been done. As usual Mr. Thurston was chief actor. The posters calling a mass meeting were printed and posted, Minister Stevens was again consulted and by evening the plans were well developed. (2) Reports were given regarding the action of the cabinet during the day and the various members of the committee were assigned special duties and responsibilities. (3) Before the meeting adjourned a message came from the cabinet asking to see a committee of five from the committee of safety. This request was complied with on Monday morning when Messrs. McCandless, Bolte, Wilder, McChesney and Waterhouse went to the cabinet. Nothing of any importance was wanted and the committee returned. (4)

This closes the account of the action taken by each side on Sunday. It should be remembered that during the day Min-

(I) Reports, I773

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. I774 .

ister Stevens had been consulted by both parties and was thoroughly informed regarding the plans of both. He had been found fully in sympathy with the Committee as opposed to the cabinet.

The next meeting of the committee was held at Mr. Thurston's office at nine o'clock on Monday. (I) Preparations for revolution were now swiftly carried forward. Arrangements were made for the mass meeting to take place at two o'clock. Mr. W.C. Wilder was persuaded to act as chairman and the speakers were selected . Mr. Thurston presented a poster prepared by himself upon his own responsibility. The document was exceedingly radical and denounced in strong terms the "fraud which had been practiced upon them". Mr. Smith says that the tone of the document was not favored by the meeting as it was judged to be "inflammatory" and it was decided not to allow it to be posted. (2) It was this meeting on Monday which made the first formal request to Minister Stevens to land the American troops. The request was drawn up, signed by the committee and given to Minister Stevens before the mass meeting in the afternoon. But it was understood that it should not be acted upon until the committee sent another notification. (3)

While the meeting was in progress Marshal Wilson went

(I) Reports, I773

(2) Ibid. I732

(3) Daily Pacific Commercial Advertiser. Jan. I7. I893.

(R4) Reports. I020 - I024.

to the committee hoping to effect a reconciliation and stop the mass meeting for the afternoon. He stated that the Queen had recalled her intention of a new constitution and had promised to rule according to the old constitution. He also promised to stand responsible for the fulfillment of such a pledge.(I) But the committee had already reached its final decision and was not now disposed to let the matter drop.

So the mass meetings went on. One at the armonry composed of citizens supporting the committee of safety. The other at the palace composed largely of natives. The invitation to attend the armory meeting was extended to all" those who were opposed to the late revolutionary methods of the Queen". (2) Those who responded were largely from the property owners of the community. All the business houses of the city were closed and the meeting was well attended. (3) Mr. Wilder presided and after he had made a short address several others took part. Among these we find Mr.Glade, the German consul already mentioned, Alexander Young who had been one of the speakers at the mass meeting of 1887, Mr. Bolte and Mr. Emmeuluth of the committee , and Mr. Baldwin, the owner of several large sugar plantations. (4)

Some of these speeches have been preserved and from a careful study of those at my command I am unable to find

(I) Reports. I020 -I024.

(2) Ibid. I732.

(3) Ibid I020

any words which necessarily imply dethronement of the Queen and the establishment of a new government. (I) The fact is that the committee had been very careful in choosing the wording of all its public documents and speeches. There is nothing in the call for the mass meeting, in the report of the committee read there, in the speeches, or in the resolutions adopted by the meeting which would support the statement that the object of this mass meeting was to dethrone the Queen. (2) On the other hand it is claimed by all of these documents that it is the wish of the committee to prevent the Queen from changing the constitution , and make sure of good government. (3)

But such a conclusion is based only upon a strictly literal interpretation of the wording of the documents. If we read the same documents carefully , understanding their setting and their relation to both earlier and later events, we can easily see that a real meaning is hidden under our first literal interpretation. Dethronement was the object of the meeting, the desire of all the speakers, and the one thought which controlled the action of the committee. But this could not be expressed. The committee must first find out the temper of the people and must be cautious in expressing it's own views, or treason might be charged and the whole

(I) Reports. I774

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid I022

movement become a failure.

Before the mass meeting several copies of the request ma made to Minister Stevens were prepared. Five or six blank sheets of paper were attached to each copy and various members of the committee had taken the copies. It was the intention of the committee to circulate these at the mass meeting for signatures, for since the troops could not be landed at the request of the Queen's government it was highly desirable to have them landed at the request of the people as a whole.(I These petitions were not circulated, probably because the expression of the people did not warrant it. And not only did the committee hesitate to present the petitions, but it also made an effort to delay the landing of the troops and hold back the order already given Minister Stevens. (2)

The last clause of the resolutions presented to the mass meeting is also valuable as it shows what extreme care had been used by the committee in making its preparations and ascertaining the feeling of the people. This reads as follows; "and we do hereby further empower such committee to further consider the situation and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to secure permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii". (3) From the standpoint of the commit-

(I) Reports. I759

(2) Ibid. I390

tee this too had a double meaning. It might mean nothing more than to secure good government from the Queen, or it might give the committee unlimited power as to dethronement or in fact any other method which it might desire. Whether the mass meeting as a whole, or even a major part, fully understood the import of this clause might be questioned. In reply it can only be stated that I find record of one man only either noticing or questioning the meaning of the clause, while everything points to the fact that the leaders purposely worded it as they did in order to increase or decrease the measures they were planning according to the support given by the meeting. (1) If the people were ready to give their support this clause might mean everything which they had in mind. If they were opposed and the committee should be called upon to explain its action the clause might be almost meaningless.

Very different in composition and character was the so-called " law and order" meeting held at palace square. The number in attendance was considerably smaller, the tone of the speakers conservative, cautious and moderate. The resolution of the Queen that she would no longer seek to change the constitution was read and accepted. (2)

Immediately after the mass meeting the committee held

(I) Reports. I774

(2) Ibid

(3) Ibid .

(4) Ibid. 597,Mr. Thurston.

(5) Ibid. I776.

another conference at which it was decided definitely to make an attempt to overthrow the Queen and establish a new government. (I) But the time was short, and ammunition and arms had not been as easily secured as the committee had hoped. Some of the members realizing the shortness of the time felt that there was a great lack of preparation on their part and questioned what might be the influence of landing troops before their part of the programme was perfected. These suggested that it would be wiser to delay landing until the next day when the committee would be better prepared to resist if a conflict should result. In accordance with this idea a request was sent to Minister Stevens to delay the landing of the troops. (2)

Mr. Stevens' reply to the committee was that the troops would be landed at five o'clock whether they were ready or not. (3) Probably it is this reply which gives a basis of truth to Mr.Thurston's statement " that Stevens and Wiltse acting upon their own responsibility and discretion and irrespective of the request or action of the committee" landed the troops. (4)

Minister Stevens was strictly true to his " strong pressure and continual vigilance" policy, for promptly at five o'clock the troops from the Boston were landed. (5)

The negotiations for this landing are one of the most fascinating studies in the whole revolution. We have already seen how hard it was to reconcile the desires of the committee and Minister Stevens with the principles of international law. The later phases of the question are no less interesting than the earlier. The formal request which was given to Minister Stevens before the mass meeting on January 16, read as follows:

"Citizens' Committee of Safety to Mr. Stevens.

Sir: We, the undersigned citizens and residents of Honolulu, respectfully represent that, in view of recent public events in this Kingdom culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Lilioukalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced, and lives and property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States forces at your command for assistance.

" The Queen with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution; and, while prevented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly that she would only defer her action.

"This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circumstances which have created general alarm and terror.

(I) Reports. I309

(2) Lieut. Swinburn. Ibid. 469

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces ".

Signed by the Committee of Safety. (I)

The first criticism to be made upon this document is based upon the words "citizens' committee", for we have noted before that only one-half of the number were citizens of Honolulu. Second, with the utmost of liberality not more than half the members can be looked upon as Americans. The rest were Hawaiian, English and German. Therefore the appeal to the American Minister was not from Americans and more than from any other nationality. A third remarkable point is found in the last clause. Here Mr. Stevens is not asked to secure the life and property of Americans which is the customary request under such circumstances. No mention is made of American life and property. After reiterating the action of the Queen and stating that life and property were in danger the Committee states " we are unable to protect ourselves without aid and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces".

Minister Stevens passed on this request to Captain Wiltse personally while the mass meeting was in session.(I) But the wording of Minister Stevens' request was quite different and conformed to the usual reading. Captain Wiltse was asked

(I) Minister Stevens' Request. Reports. 2163

to land the troops to protect American "life and property".(I)

A comparison of these requests leads to some interesting conclusions, and furnishes a spectacle unheard of in American history. The United States and Hawaii were at peace. Many citizens and residents of Honolulu, among them several who still owed allegiance to the United States, Germany and England, were not satisfied with the governmental conditions of the islands. These decided to establish a new government, but knowing that they could not carry on a revolution alone they appealed to the resident minister of one foreign country for help. This appeal was sanctioned by the minister and passed on to the naval commander of the same country. In doing so the wording of the appeal was changed to a statement less in keeping with the actual facts, but more allowable in international law. One who understands these facts may well be surprised both at the action of the committee and that of Minister Stevens. It was the govenrment of the Queen which was responsible to the United States government for the lives and property of Americans, and any request for their protection should have come from herself and her ministers when they felt that they were no longer able to give it themselves. Minister Stevens and the committee knew this and tried to avoid the difficulty. Why then, under such

circumstances should the committee have looked to Minister Stevens for aid ? The answer is not hard to find. Because from his first connection with the Hawaiian government, Minister Stevens had been opposed to the monarchy and its policy. He had meddled in an unwarranted way with local politics and had favored and encouraged in every possible way the element in the country which opposed monarchy and desired annexation. He had not hesitated to express his opinion upon all occasions and was more than once censured by officials and leading men for such indiscretion. More than this he had been in constant communication with the leaders of the revolution and at the very outset had given them a verbal promise of assistance, and assured them of safety in their attempt.

Captain Wiltse and Minister Stevens worked in perfect harmony and were thoroughly agreed regarding the revolution. It would not be necessary to prove that Minister Stevens was a visitor to the Boston, in fact we could hardly look for evidence to support such a claim. The statement of his supporters that he was not on the ship after leaving it on the fourteenth is of no value for them or for us, for there is abundant evidence to prove that there was constant communication between the naval commander, Minister Stevens, and the committee. That these three parties were in sympathy

(I) Reports. 469

from beginning to end has been clearly proved, and that Captain Wiltse was on shore frequently, and Mr. Cooper was sent to the Boston with messages is equally well established. The lieutenants on the Boston claim that it was after Mr. Cooper had left the ship that it was decided to land the troops. (I)

Thus there seem to be two parallel stories, carefully, and I am inclined to think much less hastily arranged than one might suppose. The first is for effect, for the ear and criticism of the public. It runs as follows. On Monday the committee called a mass meeting to see what the people really desired them to do. They felt that the people had expressed themselves as fully dissatisfied with the government of the Queen and as desirous of a change in government. What the change should be they did not specify but had full confidence in the judgment of the committee. In the last clause of their resolution they expressed their confidence by giving the committee liberty to act as seemed best. The committee then decided to form a new government in order to carry out the feeling of the people. But as it had had no time to arrange for the safety of property and feared fires and other acts of lawlessness during the night it asked Minister Stevens to land the American troops to protect lives and property.

The other story made up from disconnected testimony, and a document here and there is as follows. Captain Wiltse and Minister Stevens had long been in sympathy with the action of the committee and had agreed to furnish it assistance for the overthrow of the native government and the establishment of a provisional government . After the mass meeting the committee held a conference and felt that it had not time to perfect its plans, nor had it had quite as enthusiastic support as had been expected. It seemed better to delay the landing of the troops until they were fully prepared to go on with the revolution. Minister Stevens was communicated with but refused to comply with their request to delay the landing. It is entirely natural to wonder if Mr. Stevens' refusal was due to a feeling that if the committee were allowed to take one backward step it might decide to give up the whole attempt. I find no help in answering such a question. But it would seem that this second request to Minister Stevens to delay the landing of the troops proves beyond a doubt that the troops were not landed to protect the city from incendiarism but to suit the convenience of, and assist the designs of the provisional government. Is this clear?

The details of the landing of the battallion do not need to be discussed for the present purpose. There is one

(I) Reports. 542, I865

(2) Ibid. I393.

(3) Ibid.

point, however, which should be mentioned. That is the location of the troops after landing.

Already two reasons have been mentioned for landing the troops and two forms of request used in different cases. If we understand the position occupied by the troops it will help us in deciding which form was genuine and which was really complied with. The building selected by Mr. Stevens and Captain Wiltse as most desirable for the troops was the opera house. This could not be secured, but Arion Hall immediately in the rear was substituted for it (I) The accompanying diagram shows the location of the hall, the government buildings, the palace and station house. Only a few arguments will be presented which probably had most weight in leading the committee and its allies to select this position.

It is claimed by the Queen's party that this hall was selected with a view to protecting the government buildings from attack by her forces, and that it was not a suitable location if the object was the protection of American life and property. (2) The most valuable support for such claims is , first of all, the location of the hall which would expose the American troops to fire if the Queen's troops should attack the provisional forces at the government building. (3)

(I) Admiral Sherrett. Reports, I346

(2) Ibid. 730

(3) Ibid. I340. 645.

(4) Stowens, 542 ; Laird,334

(5) Reports. 638, I090, 2I74.

Second, this was not the part of the city occupied by American residents, and there was little American property in the neighborhood. (I) Third, the same position now held by the American troops had been occupied by the sharpshooters of the government in the insurrection of 1889 and had proved the most desirable location for defending the government building. (2) Fourth, several military men as well as a number of citizens concur in the opinion that if the troops were located to protect American life and property their position was badly chosen , but if their design was the support of the provisional troops the place was well chosen. (3)

The provisional government made no attempt to defend its selection except upon the ground that it was as near the American property as any other place which could have been secured. (4) This last is not strictly true,as the armory was at the disposal of the provisional troops and had always been used when troops had been landed before. (5) Its worst fault this time was that it was too far from what would be the scene of action and would not allow the troops to remain neutral and at the same time virtually take a part.

The use of the armory was suggested by one of the officer as the most desirable place as the troops could thus be nearer the base of their supplies. Mention is also made of one

(I)Reports, 630

(2) Stevens,Reports, 567; I846, I845

(3) Text, Reports, I845

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ibid, I774.

other place which could have been secured, nearer the centre of the town, more in the American quarter and easily obtained (I)

Word soon spread about town that the troops were landing and questions arose on every hand as to why this should be done. Protests were at once made to Minister Stevens, both by the ministers of the Queen, and the governor of the island. (2) The protest of the ministers requested the authority for landing the troops and stated that any protection which was desired or needed would be given by the Queen's government.(3) Minister Stevens answered the protest the next day in a very evasive manner offering no explanation. (4)

The other protest, from the governor of Oahu, is worded in a dignified , self-possessed way failing entirely to sustain the charge that the officials were paralyzed and did not know how to act. (5) To Governor Cleghorn Minister Stevens sent another vague, unsatisfactory reply. (6)

Minister Stevens' " strong pressure" policy under which he landed the troops of the Boston whether the Committee was ready for them or not, hastened the completion of the plans already suggested. A meeting was held at Mr. Waterhouse's on Monday evening. (7) All the members were present except Messrs. Thurston, Castle, and Wilder, who were ill. J.B.

(I) Reports, I774 .

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. I775

(4) Ibid .

(5) Ibid.

(6) Idib.

(7) Ibid.

Castle acted as substitute for W.R. Castle, and C.L. Carter for Mr. Thurston. Beside these Cecil Brown, Mr. Soper, Mr. Wundenberg and a few others were present on invitation. (I)

No time was now wasted in discussing the object in view. That was well understood and no effort was made to conceal it. (2) There was but one desire and that was the overthrow of the government and the organization of a new one looking toward annexation. Arrangements were at once made for the organization of this new government. (3) An executive council of five members, and an advisory council of thirteen were decided upon. Messrs. Bolte and Carter were selected to prepare a list from which these members might be chosen. (4)

Every member of the committee desired to make Judge Dole chairman of the executive committee with the understanding that after the organization of the new government he should become president. (5) His name had been discussed at a previous meeting and Mr. Bolte was now appointed to consult with him and receive his reply. (6) Judge Dole agreed to return with Mr. Bolte and talk over the situation with the committee, but he was unwilling to accept the position offered with further consideration.(7) " He recognized that the logical events and manifest destiny of the island was annexation, but he did not know whether it was the wisest step

(1) [illegible]

(2) [illegible]

(3) [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], 1977

(4) [illegible]

(5) [illegible] 1977 .

(I) Reports I775

(2) Ibid

(3) Soper, Reports 450, I779

(4) Ibid.

(5) Reports 222I .

now" (I)

Financial matters were entrusted to a committee consisting of McCandless, McChesney, and J.B. Castle. It was to be their duty to collect the lists of arms and ammunition and buy or otherwise procure the same. (2)

The perfection of a military organization was the hardest task. Already enough has been said upon this subject to make it perfectly clear that there was practically no military force at the command of the committee. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth sub-committees had been looking up arms , men, and ammunition, and what few were secured were mainly from the old Honolulu Rifles. Colonel Soper was offered the command of scuh troops as they could collect(3) This offer he declined (4) The matter was pressed, and finally when he was assured, either personally or by reports brought directly from Minister Stevens, that he need have no fear as the troops were going to protect the committee in its movement, he accepted the position.(5)

One witness is found who says that the committee felt so secure in the success of its undertaking that it even talked of sending the Claudine to San Francisco with dispatches and commissioners to the United States without waiting for the results of the revolution. This was not favored by a majority of the members and it was decided to wait un-

now" (1)

Financial matters were entrusted to a committee consisting of Ilderim, Odhemey, and Ali. Cecilia. It was to be their duty to collect the light of [illegible] and it was duty of Ali to guard the area. (2)

The perfection of a military organization was the business at hand. Already enough has been said to indicate which to show it was only since that there was practically no military [illegible] at the command of the country. [illegible] strength to the [illegible] sub-committee [illegible] to arms, [illegible] and equipment and what [illegible] could muster from the old Ibendian Militia. Colonel [illegible] offered the command of [illegible] troops as they [illegible] (3) it is [illegible] be decided (4) The matter was [illegible], and [illegible] it was [illegible], either personally or [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible], that he [illegible] the [illegible] the troops [illegible] going to protect the [illegible] in the [illegible], to [illegible] the position.(5)

One [illegible] is found who [illegible] [illegible] no [illegible] in the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] failed of [illegible] the Claudius to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] to the United [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] of the revolution. [illegible] [illegible] by a majority of the members and it was [illegible] [illegible]

(I) Smith, Reports I775

(2) Ibid. I776

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid 75I.

(5) Ibid. 460.

til the new government was a reality. (I)

The meeting adjourned late Monday evening, every member of the committee having positive assurance that the support of the American Minister was his, and that as soon as the government building was in their possession they would be recognized as a de facto government.

On Tuesday morning the committee met for final reports.(2 The names of those who had consented to go upon the councils were read and were as follows . An executive council of four members, Judge Dole, J.A. King, P.C. Jones, and W.O. Smith. Upon the formation of the provisional government these four men were to form the executive department. (3) Probably no man in Honolulu was so well fitted for the leading position in the new government as Judge Dole, and the committee was exceedingly fortunate in securing his services. He was a man above reproach both morally and intellectually, and was looked up to and respected by the entire community. He was broad minded, just, conservative, and dispassionate. At the time of his selection he was one of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Hawaii. (4) As soon as he made up his mind to accept the presidency of the new government he resigned this position under the monarchy. (5) It is most interesting in this connection to note that Judge Dole recog-

(I) Reports, I776

(2) Ibid. 765, I395.

nized that a genuine Hawaiian government was in existence until it was overthrown by the provisional government, for he handed his resignation to such a government on the very day of the revolution . In this way he refuses to support those who claim that there was no legitimate government in Hawaii from the fourteenth to the seventeenth.

With the exception of J.A. King the other members are already known to the student of Hawaiian history. Mr. Jones was a member of the reform cabinet at the opening of the year. Mr. Smith has been mentioned as one of the leading members of the committee of safety. Mr. King's history is not given in the reports and we can only judge his character from the fact that he was entirely satisfactory to Judge Dole as a co-worker.

The advisory council consisted of fourteen members, six of these were Americans never having given up their allegiance to the United States. (I) Nine of the number, Emmeluth, Brown, McCandless, Castle, McChesney, Bolte, Wilder, and Thurston were selected from those who were already members of the committee of safety. The five new members were, S. M. Damon, a native; W.G. Ashley, E.D. Tenney, James F. Morgan, and F.J. Wilhelm,all American citizens. (2)

This council in conjunction with the executive council

(1) Bergson. 1900.

(2) Idem.

(3) Idem.

(4) Idem.

(1) Reports. 1776.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

was to form one body for general legislative functions.

It was also decided to see if the Claudine could go to San Francisco bearing messages and commissioners to the United States,and what would be the cost of the voyage. The International Steamship Companies were asked not to allow any vessels to leave Honolulu for any of the other islands before ten o'clock the next morning. (I)

The committee adjourned for lunch and then met again to complete its business and make public its proclamation of abrogation. (2) The two councils had arranged to meet the volunteer forces at the government building at three o'clock where the proclamation was to be read and the new officers installed. (3)

While the committee was in Mr. Smith's office awaiting this hour there was some communication between its members and Captain Wiltse, then personally in charge of the American troops. (4) We have no knowledge of the contents of these letters, but it is a fact of some significance that Captain Wiltse himslef should have been in command of the troops just at this time.

As the appointed hour drew near the committee became very anxious regarding the preparations which might have been made for its reception at the government building. A. S. Wilcox was asked to go up to the building and see if there

(1) [illegible] 1972.

( ) [illegible].

(2) [illegible].

(3) [illegible] 1974.[illegible].

(4) [illegible].

(I) Reports. 45I, I776.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid. 582, 577.655.

(5) Ibid.

was any sign of opposition or any armed force there to defend the building. (I) He did as he was asked, and reported that there was no opposition, the buildings were empty and no one seemed to be preparing to meet them. (2)

. Just at this point fortune seems to have favored the plans of the committee. At about half past two one of the wagons of the provisional government loaded with arms and ammunition was going to the armory when a policeman attempted to stop it. A pistol shot was fired which wounded the policeman and the wagon passed on.(3) The effect of this little incident just at this time was of considerable importance to the committee. Seizing the opportunity when the excitement had drawn the attention of all parties to the scene of the shooting, the committee hastened to the government building , dividing into squads that they might attract less attention. (4) If we may believe their own words those who took part in this novel procession were far from easy in their minds as to the outcome of their attempt. (5) If the American troop should fail them theyhad no help to fall back upon.

Of course they reached the building before their supporters were there as it must have been nearly half an hour before the appointed time. Mr. Cooper read the proclamation at once without audience and the government of Hawaii was

(I) Reports, 626

(2) Ibid.

taken possession of in the name of the provisional government (I) Mr. McCandless tells that " the taking was very easy". (2 This is to me a most expressive sentence and one full of relief for the speaker. At the same time there is an element of the riduculous about the whole performance that one who has worked over the whole story and read the accounts of all the various participants, and felt the anxiety in the minds of the leaders as they take one step after another, cannot help appreciating and enjoying. Imagine the scene. The government building stands silent and unprotected in the centre of the square. To the left is a high fence which conceals the American troops who are ready at any time to lend moral or material aid to the revolutionists in taking this defenceless building.

In another part of town eighteen men come cautiously out of an office. With fear and trembling they proceed to the lonely building. These men are prepared for attack, imprisonment, or death if need be. They look anxiously about, listen for the imaginary shouts of their opponents and the noise of their arms. They draw nearer and nearer, they hold their breath in suspense. They reach the building, enter cautiously, peer into the rooms. Their vision has vanished, there is no friend to welcome, no foe to oppose. The leader walks to the

[illegible] creation of in the name of the proletariat [illegible]

(1) The Communiqué tells that " the [illegible] very [illegible]". (2)

[illegible] to be a more appropriate word [illegible] and the kind of

[illegible] the present. In the [illegible] there is no element

[illegible] the citizens about the whole proper [illegible] that are

[illegible] over the whole [illegible] and need the [illegible] of all

the [illegible] participate, and not the [illegible] in the [illegible]

of [illegible] or their [illegible] after [illegible], cannot

[illegible] [illegible] and [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] in the square. To the left is a [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] or material aid to the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] part of form [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] of [illegible]. With [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to the

[illegible] [illegible]. These [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]

[illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. They [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]. They [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible]. They [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

(I)Reports. 620, I774 .

(2)Ibid. 587, I779, I760.

(3) Ibid. I033.

front porch and with shaking hands and a trembling voice, he reads the proclamation upon which hangs the fate of a nation. And this to an invisible audience. (I) In truth the taking was easy.

Knowledge of what was taking place at the government building soon spread about town. Before the reading was finished a few supporters and spectators had gathered. The crowd increased rapidly and soon a large number was present. (2) Just what part of this number was intending to act as assistants to the committee is not possible to decide. And indeed it has not a very important bearing upon the subject, for the real military force upon which the committee relied was the men of the Foston. Moreover the men who refused to serve the new government before it had taken possession were now ready to take up arms and draw pay for their services. They now felt that there was no personal risk involved.

No effort was made by the Queen to oppose the seizure of the government building, but a majority of the buildings and those which were strongest were still in her hands. These the committee did not try to take.

Immediately after the reading of the proclamation the new councils met and proceeded to organize for business.(3) Messages were sent to all the foreign ministers stating that

(I) Text, Reports 1018

"the Hawaiian monarchy had been abrogated and a provisional government established", which was " in possession of the government departmental buildings, the archives and the treasury". This government was to remain in power until annexation could be accomplished. Upon this statement they asked to be recognized as the existing de facto government of the Hawaiian islands. (I)

From this time on the remaining events of the revolution become more complex and more difficult to analyze. Our interest centres around three interdependent points. (I) At what time and upon what grounds did Minister Stevens recognize the Provisional government ? (2) What communication did Minister Stevens have with the ministers of the Queen on Tuesday ? (3) At what time and why did the Queen finally surrender?

In attempting to answer these questions we meet the hardest task of the whole subject. Testimony is abundant, but Minister Stevens' own words are contradictory and almost valueless. Nearly every man is prejudiced, and those who understand the circumstances best and could be most valuable are unwilling to disclose what they know. In fact the influence of time and place is such that we can hardly expect reliable information. Most of the testimony would be entire-

(I) Minister Stevens. Reports, 546

(2) Ibid. 547, 548

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

(5)Ibid.

(6) Ibid. 548, I75I, I332

ly useless were it not for the written records at the legation containing the documents exchanged at this time. These serve as a guiding thread for one in checking other contemporary witnesses.

The events of Tuesday afternoon are as follows. Minister Stevens did not leave the legation, as , according to his own statements he was too ill to do so. (1) Early in the afternoon he received a message from the Queen asking him to come to the palace and confer with her. (2) This he declined to do, and therefore the ministers of the Queen visited him at the legation. (3) The object of the conference was to find out what Mr. Stevens intended to do, and to inquire if it would be possible for him to call upon Captain Wiltse to use the American troops in behalf of the Queen's government.(4 Just what conversation may have passed we do not know, but the ministers left feeling that Mr. Stevens had promised, and intended to assist the provisional forces against their government. (5)

They reported their conclusions to the Queen. She felt much dissatisfied with the verbal answer given them and it was thought best to write a letter to Mr. Stevens asking a written reply that they might read in "black and white" what he proposed to do. (6) This letter was written by Mr. Rosa

(I) Hopkins, Reports, I33I

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid. Hopkins, Peterson, Colburn, Rosa.

(4) Ibid.

about three o'clock and was carried to Mr. Stevens by Mr. Hopkins who states that when he reached the legation he gave the letter to Miss. Stevens. She asked if an answer was necessary, and he said it was required. She retired with the note and after about ten minutes returned saying that her father was too ill to respond at once but if he would return in about an hour he would be given a reply. Mr. Hopkins answered that he was expected to wait for an answer and would doso. Miss Stevens again went to her father and after abput ten minutes delay returned with a letter in reply.(I) Upon his return to the station house Mr. Hopkins delivered this message to Mr. Parker, minister of foreign affairs, to whom it was directed. (2)

This reply of Minister Stevens is not accessible, in fact it seems to have disappeared altogether, but those who had access to it at the time concur in their accounts. It was a mere statement of the fact that Minister Stevens had recognized the provisional government as the de facto government of the islands. (3) This letter was received at the station house soon after three o'clock, or at the very latest before four. (4)

If Minister Stevens told the truth in this note to the ministers sometime between the arrival of the note, telling

(I) Reports. 549

him of the establishment of the provisional government and his answer to the Queen's ministers he must have recognized the provisional government. When could this note of recognition have been sent to President Dole ? The latest limit must be placed before four o'clock as it was about four when the committee was sent to negotiate for the surrender of the station house. They then used Minister Stevens' recognition as an argument in trying to induce the commander to surrender. In addition to this Minister Stevens himself said in his letter that he had recognized the provisional government, and this letter was received by the Queen's ministers not later than four o'clock. The earlier limit, or the time before which it must have been sent is not easy to decide. At first sight one might be inclined to say that of course it was after the proclamation of the new government, and after the councils had had time to send out the notices of its success to the foreign ministers. There are several things which should be considered before accepting this time limit as the true one. Prominent among them is the fact that Mr. Stevens when questioned regarding the time of recognition becomes very much confused and makes answers which conflict badly.(I) Finally he is led to state that he thinks he recognized about five o'clock, and that he had probably prepared the note of recognition before that and had it ready to sign when the

(1) Reports, 549

(2) Reports, 1413, 1447.

time came. When questioned as to his reason for such haste his reply is, " I prepared a note beforehand and had it in readiness, because it was open as any railroad meeting would be in your city or mine." He is next asked how he sent this note to President Dole , and he can not tell. He thinks he might have sent it by cadet Pringle, but just as likely by Mr. Carter . He thinks he sent it after five o'clock. (2)

Another question which arises is , why did Mr. Stevens ask Mr. Hopkins to delay an hour ? There seem to be but two reasons for such a request. One that he might have time to recognize the provisional government during the delay. The other that it was not yet know that the provisional government was really established and he felt that he must wait at least a reasonable time as it would not do to say that he had recognized a government before it was in existence. Only one statement is made which helps at all upon this point. It contains a valuable suggestion although we are unable to prove anything by it. It is the testimony of Mr. Smith which implies that Minister Stevens had written out his recognition and given it to Judge Dole before the establishment of the new government. (2) The time element alone is strong support for such a conclusion and it certainly would be in harmony with the other acts of Minister Stevens at this time.

(I) Reports, 2202, I087, I500, 740I, I2I4, I207, I048, I029, 472, 548, I344, I76I, I777.

Such a conclusion seems quite possible, and therefore so long as there is no further evidence at hand to make proof more certain I should be unwilling to accept the earliest time of recognition as after the establishment of the provisional government.

As to Minister Stevens' reason for recognizing the new government so promptly there is but one conclusion. That he did so purposely so that his recognition might be of assistance in causing the surrender of the Queen and thus help to make the success of the provisional government sure. The best authorities on international law do not recognize as legal any such recognition and in truth there could be no legitimate basis for such an act. This Mr. Stevens himself knew only too well. The provisional government was not in possession of the government of Hawaii when Minister Stevens gave it his recognition and nothing can justofy his action at this time. In addition to this no other foreign power recognized the government on the seventeenth, and Captain Wiltse twice refused his recognition until the committee had possession of the station house, barracks, palace and all the Queen's troops. (I)

On the same day, January seventeenth, President Dole acknowledged Minister Stevens'recognition and requested the

(1) Reports, 1372

Text, 1372.

(3) Swinburn, Reports 471; 1415

(I) Reports, I373

Text, I373.

(3) Swinburn, Reports 47I; I4I5

the commander of the American troops to take charge of the provisional forces so that they might act together for the protection of the city.(1) Such a request at this time, when Minister Stevens had already given his recognition, would hardly support the statement so many times made, that the provisional government was strong enough to carry out the revolution and did not desire or expect the assistance of foreign troops. This request from President Dole is on file at the legation and at the end Minister Stevens has placed the words, " The above request not complied with". (2)

This note was answered by Minister Stevens but no copy of the answer was placed on file. Mr. Blount had no little difficulty in securing it. Finally he obtained it from President Dole. In his reply Minister Stevens made no objection whatever to the request for assistance, and none upon his part, to the American officer taking charge, but he did not think that Captain Wiltse would favor such a plan. He promised however, to have Captain Wiltse come to the legation and confer with him after which he would notify President Dole of their decision. (3)

That Captain Wiltse did go to the legation in answer to such a summons is certain, but this was about six o'clock

(1) Swinburn, Reports 471. 457

(2) Carter , Reports 1540

and the Queen had not yet surrendered. There is no other message from Minister Stevens to President Dole giving the result of this interview. Captain Wiltse made a personal visit to the new government immediately after his return from the legation and probably gave his own decision verbally. At this time Captain Wiltse refused to recognize the provisional government as it was not in possession of all the government buildings. (I)

After the foreign representatives had been notified and Minister Stevens recognition had been given, negotiations regarding the surrender of the Queen were opened. Naturally this matter should have been attended to before the notifications were sent to the foreign countries. Unless there was some particular reason for other arrangements the councils should have secured complete possession of the Queen's government and then notified the representatives. As it was the council seems to have sought delay so that even when an effort toward settlement was made the first proposition came from the side of the Queen. Two of her ministers came up to the government building and wanted to settle the matter without fighting. No conclusion was reached and Messrs. Damon and Colte were selected to return to the station house with the ministers and talk over the situation. (J) They soon

[illegible] (7)

[illegible] (7)

[illegible] (8)

[illegible] (7)

[illegible] (7)

[illegible] (7)

(1) Reports, 1546, 1442

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

returned bringing the other ministers with them.(I) Then President Dole made a formal demand upon them for the surrender of the station house, palace and forces of the Queen. The ministers were unwilling to consider such a demand without consulting the Queen and asked that a committee be appointed to go with them to the palace and talk it over with her. (2) Such a committee was selected, and Mr. Damon was made chairmen.(3) They informed the Queen that she had been dethroned and a provisional government had been established. That Minister Stevens had already recognized the new government and was going to assist it with the United States troops. Considerable time was consumed in discussion and every effort was made to convince the Queen that it was useless to resist as she would only bring on trouble with the United States and must be defeated eventually. (4)

After some delay she decided to accept their proposal and surrender under protest. Messrs Neumann and Carter were asked to draw up the protest. The Queen ordered Marshal Wilson to surrender the station house. (5) He refused to do this until he had a written order from the Queen. (6) The majority of the testimony which I have used has not done justice to this faithful supporter of the Queen, for had he not been restrained by the ministers he would never have

(I) Senate Executive Documents 2nd. Session, 52nd. Congress, page 22.

allowed the provisional government even to from its committees. Arrests would have been made before the members could have perfected their plan, and even at this late date when one building was in the hands of the new government and it was sure of support from the United States he could not be induced to surrender without a written order from the sovereign. Probably had the management of the Queen's party been more entirely in his hands the committee of safety could never have carried out its plans.

When the protest was completed the Queen signed it and very willingly agreed to the terms supposing , of course, that the proposition which had been made her as to its future consideration would be known and investigated at Washington. (I)

This protest was taken to President Dole who received and indorsed it. In doing this he virtually accepted the Queen's statement that she surrendered to "the superior forces of the United States of America, whose minister plenipotentiary, his excellency John L.Stevens had caused the United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the provisional government ". It should be noted that this protest was at least partially prepared by one of the members of the provisional government, and was

(7)

(1) Senate Executive Documents, 1317

(2) Wilson, Reports 1450

(3) Ibid.1317

accepted by the President. (1)

The Queen then ordered the surrender of the station house. It was taken possession of by the provisional government about seven o'clock the same evening. (2)

In connection with this surrender and the knowledge of the Queen regarding Minister Stevens' action Mr. Damon says that he told the Queen on Tuesday morning that she might as well surrender for Mr. Stevens was intending to help the provisional government. This seems to have been generally understood by the members of the provisional government, and also generally reported by them until it was pretty well known before the government was established. (2) This, of course, had its effect both in deciding the surrender of the Queen, and in drawing military supporters to the aid of the provisional govenment.

As I understand this final surrender it was not the intention of the Queen to abandon her power , but merely to surrender to the United States forces awaiting an opportunity to appeal for justice to the government to which they were responsible. This also seems to have been the understanding of those who advised her to surrender and assisted in preparing the protest.

During Tuesday night there was no disturbance of any

(I) Reports, 744-750

(2) Ibid. I0I5

kind and no signs of the revolution which had taken place. On Wednesday the Claudine was sent to San Francisco as had been arranged. The provisional government was recognized by several foreign government although one or two delayed until the ninetenth. (I) During the day Minister Stevens sent his account of the revolution to the Secretary of State by telegram .(2) Surely "events had moved rapidly", and by the end of the day the revolution had passed into history.

It is not my intention to go into details regarding the events following the revolution, or to discuss Minister Stevens' further activities at that time. Enough has been said to allow of definite conclusions and although evidence showing his desires and influence is as abundant after the close of the revolution as before, it was not with that phase of the subject which I started to deal and I leave it for future investigation.

(I) President Harrison's Report, Reports, I -34

Secretary Foster's Ibid. 1005

Senate Report, Ibid. 811

From the events of the revolution as outlined during the four days, January fourteenth to seventeenth inclusive, there is but one inference possible although it is a known fact that of the various government officials or committees who have undertaken to investigate this matter three have come to one conclusion ,and three to a decidedly opposite view. Of these six reports we find President Harrison, Secretary Foster, and the majority report of the Senate Committee agree in saying that there is not the slightest indication that at any time prior to the formal recognition of the new government by Minister Stevens he took any part in promoting the changes which took place in the government either by intimidating the Queen or by promising support to the provisional government. That his conduct was entirely regular and in full accord with the long established custom and precedents of this government, and that in no way was the overthrow of the monarchy promoted by him. (I)

The other three reports are those of Special Commissioner Blount, President Cleveland, and the minority of the Senate Committee. These agree that the action of Minister Stevens was directly conducive to bringing about the condition of affairs which resulted in the overthrow of the Queen, and

(I) Minority Report, Reports 35.

Blount's Report. Ibid. I333

Cleveland's Messgae. Ibid. I250

that because of the part played by him in this way he is deserving of public censure. (I) How the group of reports first mentioned can possibly support their conclusion by the evidence at the command of the government, or how they can defend their position I can not conceive.

The motive urging many of the residents to desire annexation has been given and needs no further discussion. Minister Stevens' share in their desires and in their proceedings from day to day have been minutely presented and I do not see how it would be possible to exonerate him from censure as participating to an unlawful extent in the events which led to the revolution. That he exceeded his instruction and the proper limits of his official duty when he took any part in the formation of the committee of safety or in the landing of the troops to assist the same, must be acknowledged. That he wrongfully recognized the provisional government as a de facto government when it could not possibly have existed as such and thus placed the Queen in a perilous position obliging her to surrender has been proven.

Upon this basis one must agree with the report of President Cleveland, Commissioner Blount, and the minority of the Senate " that the provisional government owed its existenc to the armed force of the U.S. landed by Minister Stevens on

the territory of Hawaii; that the overthrow of the lawful government is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the agency of the United States acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives. Had it not been for Mr. Stevens' known desire of annexation the Committee of Safety would never have been called into existence. Had it not been for the landing of the United States troops under false pretences and their location in the best possible position for the protection of the provisional government the committee would never have made its proclamation when it did. And finally except for the unlawful recognition of Minister Stevens and his promise of support to the new government, the Queen would never have surrendered.

On the other hand one can hardly agree with the few writers who question the patriotism of Minister Stevens. It is no more than just to him to say that he does not stand alone in the history of Hawaii as the only United States official who held the same opinions and would have been equally glad of an opportunity of fulfilling his desires and those of the nation which he represented. A knowledge of history in general shows us that the policy of nations through successive administrations is much more homogeneous than might appear to the casual observer. The diplomacy of ministers is often

traditional and the opportunity which seems to cause a change is often a mere incident in the chain of events. That this is largely the case in the history of the Sandwich Islands may be seen from the correspondence between the various Secretaries of State and the American ministers at Honolulu since their first recognition by this country and the assignment of a minister to that country. Of the various secretaries previous to Secretary Foster we find at least four, Marcy, Seward, Fish and Blaine in favor of annexation or reciprocity and making every effort to accomplish the same.

President Johnson and President Grant looked upon annexation as the ultimate destiny of the islands and had such a project been favored we have every reason to supppose their support would have been given.

Of course it was usually found that American ministers to Hawaii agreed with, and even urged the expression of such opinions, as they possibly more than others realized the advantages to be derived from annexation.

Thus it is that a review of the history of Hawaii shows that on more than one occasion annexation has been announced as the policy of this government and even attempted as a fact. We should not be justified in considering the late policy of Minister Stevens waiting a favorable opportunity

to overthrow the native government and take possession of these desirable and coveted islands as a policy which originated with him. The desire, already long in existence, merely culminated in his administration and received his help.

The justification of Minister Stevens' position from the standpoint of manifest destiny and civilization has been only too common. Too often it has been allowed to have weight in deciding the real influence which he had in causing the revolution. On this subject I only ask how many events of history could we justify, or could we claim were entirely right or entirely wrong ?

The only question for the student of history is ; did Mr. Stevens' support and acts cause the revolution ? We can give but one answer;" they did", and leave to other to justify his acts upon any ground they may please.